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[W]e do not want to maximize the price at which Berkshire
shares trade. We wish instead for them to trade in a narrow
range centered at intrinsic business value .

. .

.[We] are

bothered as much by significant overvaluation as significant
undervaluation.
Warren Buffett
Berkshire HathawayAnnual Report, 1988

INTRODUCTION
Warren Buffett is an anomaly. In expressing concern about the
potential overvaluation of his company's stock, the Chairman and
CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., has distinguished himself from
the vast majority of corporate managers, most of whom believe (or at
least act as if they believe) that their highest end is to maximize
their company's stock price.! But Mr. Buffett is right to be bothered
Recent events in the financial world have
by overvaluation.
revealed that overvaluation can be extremely damaging to a firm
and its shareholders.2 This revelation calls for a rethinking of
insider trading policy.
For four decades now, corporate law scholars have debated
whether the government should prohibit insider trading,3 commonly
defined as stock trading on the basis of material, nonpublic
Participants in this long-running debate have
information.4
1.

See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, 34 FIN.
5-6 (2005) ("To my knowledge, with the exception of Warren Buffett

MGMT. 5,

(who hints at these forces in his 1988 letter to Berkshire shareholders) no
leaders in the business and financial community have recognized the dangers of
overvalued equity.").
2. See id.; see also infra notes 131-215 and accompanying text (discussing
investor harms occasioned by equity overvaluation).
3. Earnest debate over the wisdom of an insider trading prohibition began
some forty years ago with the publication of Henry Manne's book, Insider
Trading and the Stock Market. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE
The literature comprising the debate is far too
STOCK MARKET (1966).

voluminous to cite exhaustively. For an excellent overview of the debate, see
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMIcs 772, 777-94 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 1999),
available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/5650book.pdf. For arguments defending
the legal prohibition on insider trading, see generally Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe
at Any Price:A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L.
REV. 1425 (1967). For arguments in favor of deregulation of insider trading, see

generally Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider
Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983).
4. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 519
(2002).
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generally assumed that trading that decreases a stock's price
("price-decreasing insider trading") should be treated the same as
trading that causes the price to rise ("price-increasing insider
trading"): either both forms of trading should be regulated, or
neither should. This Article considers whether there is a principled
basis for affording different legal treatment to the two species of
insider trading. It concludes that price-decreasing insider trading
should be treated less harshly than price-increasing insider trading.
The reason for the proposed asymmetric treatment is that pricedecreasing insider trading provides significantly more value to
investors than price-increasing insider trading. Specifically, pricedecreasing insider trading provides an effective means-perhaps the
only cost-effective means-of combating the problem of overvalued
equity,5 a problem whose magnitude commentators are just
beginning to appreciate. Overvalued equity, which occurs when a
stock's price becomes so high that it cannot be justified by expected
future earnings,7 leads managers to take a number of valuedestroying actions. Corporate insiders, of course, are in the best
position to know when the stock of their company is overvalued, and
deregulation of price-decreasing insider trading would create a
means by which they could signal the market that the stock price is
too high, thereby avoiding the costs associated with overvalued
equity. While deregulation of price-increasing insider trading could
5. Congress and securities regulators have recently sought to reduce the
costs of equity overvaluation by enacting laws and adopting rules designed to
prevent firms from becoming overvalued as a result of misinformation. Most
notably, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-24, 116 Stat. 745,
which was adopted hastily in the panicked atmosphere created by the implosion
of Enron Corporation and a massive accounting fraud at WorldCom Inc.,
imposes a number of restrictions designed to prevent overvaluation occasioned
by accounting fraud. See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to'
CorporateFraud:A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1,

11-18 (2002) (summarizing key provisions of Act); Roberta Romano, The
Sarbanes-OxleyAct and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE

L.J. 1521, 1549-68 (2005) (detailing Act's political history and demonstrating
lack of careful attention to costs and benefits of its reforms). Early indications
are that the Act's restrictions do not create investor benefits commensurate
with their substantial costs. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley
After Three Years, (U. Ill. Law & Econ. Working Papers Series, Working Paper
No. LE05-016, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=746884 [hereinafter
Sarbanes-Oxley After Three Years]; Romano, supra (reviewing empirical studies

evaluating effectiveness of key Sarbanes-Oxley provisions).
6. See generally Jensen, supra note 1.

7. Id. at 5 ("Equity is overvalued when a firm's stock price is higher than
its underlying value. .

.

. By definition, an overvalued equity means the

company will not be able to deliver-except by pure luck-the performance to
justify its value.").
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similarly remedy the problem of undervalued equity, undervaluation
causes fewer problems than overvaluation, and there are numerous
other mechanisms for addressing that sort of mispricing. Moreover,
the potential investor losses associated with price-increasing insider
trading are higher than those associated with price-decreasing
trading. Most corporations would therefore likely opt to permit (at
least some) price-decreasing insider trading, while generally
restricting price-increasing insider trading.
Of course, the signaling effect of price-decreasing insider
trading, and thus its salutary price effect, would be stronger if the
trades were publicly announced when executed. Accordingly, this
Article concludes that most corporations would, if practically and
legally able to do so, adopt an asymmetric insider trading regime
that would generally permit price-decreasing insider trades as long
Public
as they were immediately announced to the public.
disclosure would have the added benefit of policing potential
mismanagement by insiders, who might otherwise be tempted to
delay the transmission of "bad news" or even to create such news in
an attempt to generate trading profits. Given that most investors
and corporate managers would bargain for an insider trading policy
generally permitting disclosed price-decreasing insider trading,
while restricting price-increasing insider trading, regulators should
posit such a policy as the default that will govern in the absence of
express contracting. Current insider trading doctrine would permit
them to do so.8
This Article consists of three parts. Part I briefly summarizes
Part II
the long-running policy debate over insider trading.
describes the problem of overvalued equity, explains why pricedecreasing insider trading will create greater investor benefits and
impose lower investor costs than price-increasing insider trading,
and describes the sort of asymmetric insider trading policy most
corporations would adopt if expressly permitted to do so. Part III,
then, argues that regulators could approve this sort of asymmetric
insider trading regime under current law, even if the law is more
hostile to insider trading than some advocates of insider trading
deregulation assume.
8. While current insider trading doctrine would likely permit corporations
to adopt policies liberalizing price-decreasing insider trading, corporations have
not done so, most likely because regulators have not expressly promised them
(and their insiders) immunity. The SEC has a long history of seeking to expand
the insider trading prohibition. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 583-86
(discussing regulators' zeal to expand insider trading prohibition beyond the
limits of the enabling statute). While (as argued infra Part III) a corporation
legally could authorize price-decreasing insider trading, if it did so, it would
almost certainly face a lawsuit by zealous regulators.
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SUMMARY OF THE INSIDER TRADING DEBATE

The federal insider trading prohibition coexists somewhat
uneasily with the rest of the securities laws. Whereas the general
aim of most of the securities laws is to ensure the accurate pricing of
securities by requiring dissemination to the market of information
regarding the true value of securities, the insider trading
prohibition explicitly prohibits certain types of trading on the basis
of material, nonpublic information, thereby preventing such trades
from informing the market regarding the true value of the securities
at issue.9 The result is a schizophrenic regulatory regime in which
certain value-revealing disclosures are mandated, but certain valuerevealing trades are forbidden. Such regulatory schizophrenia may
make sense if there are harms associated with value-revealing
insider trading, and, of course, proponents of the insider trading ban
insist that there are. Thus, a debate has raged for the last forty
years regarding whether there truly are harms associated with
insider trading and, if so, whether they eclipse the harms created by
the insider trading ban. Because an understanding of the case for
an asymmetric insider trading regime requires a working
understanding of the broader policy debate over the insider trading
ban, I begin with a brief summary of the debate. 10
Defenders of the ban on insider trading insist that it is
fundamentally unfair for some traders to have an informational
advantage over others, particularly when the advantaged traders
are corporate insiders who are supposed to be acting as agents for
those who lack the informational advantage." Ban defenders also
contend that insider trading causes efficiency losses by (1)
discouraging investment in the apparently rigged stock market,
thereby reducing the liquidity of capital markets; 2 (2) encouraging
9. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 605 ("The basic function of a securities
fraud regime is to ensure timely disclosure of accurate information to investors.
Yet, it seems indisputable that the insider trading prohibition does not lead to
increased disclosure.").
10. Because excellent and detailed summaries of the debate exist
elsewhere, my summary is somewhat cursory. For additional detail, see
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 583-607; Bainbridge, supra note 3.
11. See,. e.g., Schotland, supra note 3, at 1439 ("Even if we found that
unfettered insider trading would bring an economic gain, we might still forego
that gain in order to secure a stock market and intracorporate relationships
that satisfy such noneconomic goals as fairness, just rewards and integrity.").
Other sources articulating versions of this fairness argument are cited infra
note 40.
12. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations
Economy, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1022, 1022-23 (1990) (asserting that insider
trading deters potential investors from securities markets, as outsiders want to
avoid dilution of their investment returns); Louis Loss, The Fiduciary Concept
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insiders to delay disclosures1 3 and to make management decisions14
that increase share price volatility but do not maximize firm value;
and (3) increasing the "bid-ask" spread of stock specialists, who
systematically lose on trades with insiders (whom they cannot
identify ex ante) and will thus tend to "insure" against such losses
by charging a small premium on each trade. 5 Finally, some
defenders of the ban assert that it is justified as a means of
property rights in valuable information
protecting the corporation's
16
regarding firm prospects.
Proponents of the deregulation of insider trading discount these
arguments and assert that insider trading can be beneficial on the
whole and ought to be limited, if at all, only by corporations

as Applied to Trading by Corporate"Insiders"in the United States, 33 MOD. L.
REV. 34, 36 (1970) (arguing that insider trading constitutes a "grievous insult to
the market in the sense that the very preservation of any capital market
depends on liquidity, which rests in turn on the investor's confidence that
current quotations accurately reflect the objective value of his investment");
Jeffrey M. Laderman et al., The Epidemic of Insider Trading, Bus. WK., Apr. 29,
1985, at 78 (quoting then American Stock Exchange Chairman Arthur Levitt,
Jr. as stating, "If the investor thinks he's not getting a fair shake, he is not
going to invest, and that is going to hurt capital investment in the long run").
13. See Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal
Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1054-55 (1982)
(arguing that, if insider trading were permitted, "[slubordinates would stall the
upward flow of critical information to maximize their opportunities for financial
gain," resulting in an "impair[mentl [of] corporate decision-making at all
hierarchical levels").
14. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the
Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 149 (1982) (noting that if insider trading
is permitted "an insider can profit from a decrease in the firm's stock price as
well as in increase; the temptation of profit might actually encourage an insider
to act against the corporation's interest"); Schotland, supra note 3, at 1451;
Morris Mendelson, The Economics of Insider Trading Reconsidered, 117 U. PA.
L. REV. 470, 489-90 (1969) (reviewing HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND
THE STOCK MARKET

(1966)).

15. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Is Selective Disclosure Now Lawful?, N.Y.
L.J., July 31, 1997, at 5 ("[T]he more that the law successfully prohibits the use
of non-public information, the more that the market maker can (and will be
forced by competitive pressure to) narrow the bid/asked spread."); Jack L.
Treynor, Securities Law and Public Policy, 50 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 10, 10 (May/June
1994) ("[Informed] trades can damage the dealer, perhaps fatally. That's a valid
reason for discouraging trading on so-called 'inside' information, quite apart
from whether such trading entails misappropriation of corporate property or
wire fraud."); Thomas E. Copeland & Dan Galai, Information Effects on the BidAsk Spread, 38 J. FIN. 1457 (1983); Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom,
Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously
Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985).
16. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 598-607.
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themselves via contract. 17 With respect to the fairness argument,
deregulation proponents retort that insider trading cannot be
"unfair" to investors if they know in advance that it might occur and
nonetheless choose to engage in the purportedly unfair trades."8
Moreover, deregulation proponents assert, the purported efficiency
losses occasioned by insider trading are overblown. There is little
evidence, they say, that insider trading reduces liquidity by
discouraging individuals from investing in the stock market, 9 and it
might actually increase such liquidity by providing benefits to
investors in equities."
With respect to the claim that insider
trading creates incentives for delayed disclosures and valuereducing management, advocates of deregulation claim that such
mismanagement is unlikely for several reasons. First, managers
face reputational
constraints that will discourage
such
misbehavior.2' In addition, managers, who generally work in teams,
cannot engage in value-destroying mismanagement without
persuading their colleagues to go along with the strategy, and any
particular employee's ability to engage in mismanagement will
therefore be constrained by her colleagues' attempts to maximize
firm value or to gain personally by exposing proposed
mismanagement. 22 With respect to the argument that insider
trading raises the cost of trading securities by increasing the bid-ask
spread, proponents of deregulation point to empirical evidence
17. See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 861.
18. Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and
Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 807-09 (1980) (observing that if the
existence of insider trading is known, outsiders will not be disadvantaged
because the price they pay will reflect the risk of insider trading); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the
Production of Information, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 309, 323-30 (discussing and
refuting fairness arguments).
19. See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 880 n.76 ("[T]he notion
that exchanges are harmed by insider trading is hard to square with the
following facts: (1) the stock market was successful pre-1933 (before insider
trading laws); (2) the stock market was successful pre-1960s (before judicial
extension of insider trading laws); (3) the stock market is currently successful
despite the existence of legal and perhaps illegal insider trading.").
20. Cf id. at 881 ("Compensating managers [by permitting insider trading]
increases the size of the pie, and thus outsiders as well as insiders profit from
the incentives managers are given to increase the value of the firm.").
21. See id. at 874 (noting that a manager will be motivated, at least in part,
by "his long run interest in his human capital").
22. See id. at 873-74 ("Managers often work in teams and thus must first
persuade one another that the firm should undertake a particular strategy....
[Tihe ability of any one manager to pursue bad opportunities will be
constrained because other managers and employees will attempt to maximize
the firm's value.").
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discounting this purported effect of insider trading.23 Finally,
deregulation proponents assert that, even if material nonpublic
information is worthy of property protection, the property right need
not be a non-transferable interest granted to the corporation;
efficiency considerations may call for the right to be transferable
and/or initially allocated to a different party (e.g., to insiders). 4
In addition to rebutting the arguments for regulation,
proponents of deregulation have offered affirmative arguments for
liberalizing insider trading. First, they maintain that insider
trading should generally be permitted because it increases stock
market efficiency (i.e., the degree to which stock prices reflect true
value), which helps guarantee efficient resource allocation.25
23. See generally Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask
Spread: A Critical Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP.
U. L. REV. 83 (2004) (surveying empirical evidence regarding insider trading's
effect on bid-ask spread and liquidity).
24. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 878 (noting that the contention
that inside information is property "does not address the key question of why
the firm and not the managers always should be allocated the property right in
information"); Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 331 (approving property rights
approach but noting that "insider trading should be permitted to the extent the
firm that created the information desires (or tolerates) such trading. The firm
extracts value through exploiting the knowledge itself or reducing the salary of
those who exploit it."); Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairnessto Contract:The New
Directionof the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFsTRA L. REV. 9, 32 (1984)
(defending use of insider trading law to protect rights to information but
arguing that "property owners--i.e., the corporations to whom the right to
inside information is allocated-should be "permitted to contract as to the use of
the information they own").
25. Although there is some disagreement concerning the extent and
timeliness of the price effect occasioned by insider trading, there is near
consensus among economists that insider trading pushes the price of a stock in
the right direction. Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets,
and the Dog that Did Not Bark 4 (ICER Working Paper No. 7-2005, 2005),
For
empirical
data
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=679662.
demonstrating that insider trading results in rapid incorporation of the impact
of nonpublic information into market price, see Ji-Chai Lin & Michael S. Rozeff,
The Speed ofAdjustment of Prices to PrivateInformation:Empirical Tests, 18 J.
FIN. RES. 143 (1995); Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal
Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1661 (1992). For data from laboratory experiments
suggesting that inside information is rapidly assimilated into market price,
even when very few insiders participate in the market, see Martin Barner et al.,
On the Microstructureof Price Determinationand Information Aggregation with
Sequential and Asymmetric Information Arrival in an Experimental Asset
Market, 1 ANNALS FIN. 73 (2005); Daniel Friedman et al., The Informational
Efficiency of Experimental Asset Markets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 349 (1984). For
theory supporting a rapid assimilation view, see Charles R. Plott & Shyam
Sunder, Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information:
An Application of Rational-Expectations Models, 90 J. POL. ECON. 663 (1982)
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Corporate insiders, after all, generally know more about their
company's prospects than anyone else. When they purchase or sell
their own company's stock, thus betting their own money that the
stock is mispriced, they convey valuable information to the
marketplace. Assuming their trades somehow become public, other
rational investors will likely follow their lead, which will cause stock
prices to reflect more accurately the underlying value of the firm.26
More efficient stock prices, then, will lead to a more efficient
allocation of productive resources throughout the economy."
Deregulation advocates further maintain that corporations
ought to be allowed to adopt liberal insider trading policies because
permitting insider trading could be an efficient form of managerial
compensation. 28 The argument here is that competition in the labor
and capital markets will lead corporations to adopt efficient insider
trading policies.29 On the one hand, the market for managerial labor
may reward corporations with liberal insider trading policies, for the
right to make money through insider trading is valuable to potential
On the other hand, capital market pressures will
managers.
prevent corporations from adopting insider trading policies that are,
on balance, harmful to investors. Because granting managers the
right to engage in insider trading lowers their salary requirements
and creates an incentive for them to create "good news" for the
corporation, the capital markets might reward firms with liberal
insider trading policies.30 To the extent insider trading causes
investor harm in excess of these benefits, however, it will be
(demonstrating through simulation techniques that markets adjust very rapidly
to inside information). For arguments that the price effect is less extensive and
rapid, see Sugato Chakravarty & John J. McConnell, Does Insider Trading
Really Move Stock Prices?, 34 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 191 (1999)
(presenting data suggesting that informed trading by insiders has the same
price affect as uninformed trading by outsiders); James D. Cox, Insider Trading
and Contracting:A Critical Response to the "Chicago School", 1986 DUKE L.J.
628, 646 (asserting that insider trading is a noisy device for communicating
stock value). For the outlier view that insider trading does not push stock
prices in the right direction, see Vernon L. Smith et al., Bubbles, Crashes, and
Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets, 56
ECONOMETRICA 1119 (1988).
26. See infra notes 260-68 and accompanying text (discussing how insider
trades lead to more efficient securities prices).
27. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (discussing allocative
inefficiencies occasioned by inaccurate securities prices).
28. See, e.g., MANNE, supra note 3, at 116-19; Carlton & Fischel, supra note
3, at 869-71.
29. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 862-63.
30. But see Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 332 (arguing that the right to
engage in insider trading is an inefficient compensation mechanism not likely to
be selected by corporations).
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disfavored by investors, who will price the firm's securities
accordingly.
Thus, deregulation advocates maintain that the
interaction of the labor and capital markets will assure that firms
will adopt insider trading policies that are, on the whole, valuemaximizing. 31
Professor Henry G. Manne, perhaps the founder of the
deregulatory camp, 2 has recently articulated what he characterizes
as a third affirmative argument for deregulation of insider trading.
He asserts that insider trading lowers the cost of managerial
decisionmaking by providing managers with valuable information
that they could not otherwise cost-effectively obtain. Drawing on
F.A. Hayek's famous observation that the chief problem facing
managers charged with resource allocation decisions is the fact that
time- and space-specific information is widely distributed,34 Manne
contends that corporate managers similarly face informational
constraints. Just as Hayek saw the price mechanism as the primary
solution to the problem of resource allocation generally," Manne
maintains that the price information generated by insider trading
can similarly guide corporate managers in making decisions about
how to allocate firm resources.36
Not surprisingly, the affirmative case for liberalizing insider
trading has not gone unchallenged. With regard to the argument
that insider trading leads to more efficient securities prices, ban
proponents retort that trading by insiders conveys information only
31. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 862-66.
32. See supra note 3; see also Henry G. Manne, Economic Aspects of
Required Disclosure Under Federal Securities Laws, in WALL STREET IN
TRANSITION 21 (1974); Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law
Professors,23 VAND. L. REV. 547 (1970).
33. See Manne, supra note 25, at 14-16. Professor Manne contends that the
managerial benefits created by insider trading explain why investors and
managers neither adopted contractual insider trading restrictions nor called for
regulation of insider trading prior to the 1960s, when the SEC began regulating
the practice in earnest. Id. at 19.
34. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519,
519-20 (1945).
35. Id. at 526.
36. Manne, supra note 25, at 14-21. Manne's notion that insider trading
creates "prices" that guide firm managers is innovative. Conventional economic
theory has drawn a distinction between the market, in which resources are
allocated in a decentralized fashion according to the price mechanism, and the
firm, in which resources are allocated via managerial fiat without reference to
prices (which generally do not exist within the firm). See R.H. Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 389 (1937) ("[Tlhe distinguishing
mark of the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism."). Manne suggests
that insider trading may generate effective "prices" to guide resource allocation
within firms.
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to the extent it is revealed, and even then the message it conveys is
"noisy" or ambiguous, given that insiders may trade for a variety of
reasons, many of which are unrelated to their possession of inside
information.3 7 Ban defenders further maintain that insider trading
is an inefficient, clumsy, and possibly perverse compensation
mechanism. 8 With regard to Manne's novel "managerial benefits"
argument, ban defenders will likely respond with a version of their
argument that insider trading is a noisy signaling device 39 After all,
the fact that the market value of the entire firm is rising or falling
would not seem to convey much helpful information to a manager
attempting to make a narrow management decision about one
particular aspect of firm operations.
A striking aspect of the well-worn insider trading debate is its
starkness: assuming that insider trading must be treated as a
whole, ban defenders and opponents have argued over liberalization
in all-or-nothing terms. They have not considered whether some
species of insider trading should be treated differently than others.
Part II of this Article argues that price-decreasing insider trading,
which consists of trading by insiders on the basis of negative
nonpublic information, provides greater net benefits to investors
than price-increasing insider trading, which consists of trading by
insiders on the basis of positive nonpublic information. Accordingly,
the law should treat price-decreasing insider trading (insider sales,
short sales, or purchases of put options) less harshly than priceincreasing insider trading (insider purchases of stock or call

37. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 574 (1984) (discussing the limits of trade
and price decoding).
38. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 591-92 (criticizing insider trading
as compensation mechanism because (1) an insider's compensation would be
determined, in part, by his wealth; (2) the right to trade could not be limited to
the insiders who created value-enhancing information; (3) "[alllowing managers
to profit from inside trading reduces the penalties associated with a project's
failure"; and (4) the value of the compensation is contingent and difficult to
measure in advance and thus would be less desirable to managers);
Easterbrook, supranote 18, at 332.
39. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Indeed, it would be proper
for ban proponents to reiterate their "noisy signal" argument here, for Manne's
managerial benefits argument is ultimately a version of the "traditional"
argument that insider trading enhances allocative efficiency by increasing the
efficiency of stock prices. Whereas the traditional argument focused on
investors' allocation of capital, Manne's latest argument focuses on managers'
allocation of corporate resources. But, of course, managers making decisions
about how to allocate corporate resources are ultimately acting as "investors,"
and the role insider trading plays in guiding managers is similar to that which
it plays in guiding individual investors.
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options).
II.

THE CASE FOR ASYMMETRIC TREATMENT OF PRICE-INCREASING
AND PRICE-DECREASING INSIDER TRADING

The argument presented herein takes efficiency as the
touchstone, 40 assuming that insider trading should be deregulated if,
but only if, the benefits of permitting such trading (or, more
accurately, of letting issuers decide for themselves whether or not to
do so) exceed the costs of doing so. Accordingly, the case for
asymmetric treatment of price-increasing and price-decreasing
insider trading is structured around consideration of the relative
costs and benefits of the two species of insider trading. Part II.A
compares the benefits of the two types of insider trading by focusing
on the relative costs of undervalued and overvalued equity.
Observing that equity overvaluation is more costly to investors than
equity undervaluation, Part II.A concludes that price-decreasing
insider trading provides greater benefit to investors, and to society
in general, than price-increasing insider trading. Part II.B, then,
compares the costs of price-increasing and price-decreasing insider

40. This is controversial. See Benjamin Alarie, Dividend Entitlements and
Intermediate Default Rules, 9 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 135, 137 (2004)
(recognizing disagreement over ultimate criteria). Most scholars considering
whether insider trading should be deregulated have taken efficiency as the
determinative criterion. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING:
ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY (1991); Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider
Trading Prohibition:A Legal and Economic Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35
(1986); Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3; Easterbrook, supra note 18; David D.
Haddock, Academic Hostility and SEC Acquiescence: Henry Manne's Insider
Trading, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 313 (1999); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R.
Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1449 (1986);
Larry E. Ribstein, Federalism and Insider Trading, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 123
(1998); Scott, supra note 18; Robert B. Thompson, Insider Trading, Investor
Harm, and Executive Compensation, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 291 (1999).
However, many others have focused on various philosophical formulations of
fairness. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Ethics of Insider Trading, 11 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POLY 727 (1988); Ian B. Lee, Fairnessand Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 119 (2002); Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading
and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117 (1982); Steven R. Salbu, The
MisappropriationTheory of Insider Trading: A Legal, Economic, and Ethical
Analysis, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 223 (1992); Kim Lane Scheppele, "It'sJust
Not Right": The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123
(1993); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principles in the Law of Insider
Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375 (1999). Because a liberalized insider trading
policy would not seem "unfair" if investors knew in advance that such trading
might occur and nonetheless chose to purchase or sell the stock at issue, see
supra note 18 and accompanying text, this Article focuses on efficiency
considerations.
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trading, concluding that the former imposes greater costs on
investors than the latter. Part II.C argues that a policy permitting
disclosed price-decreasing insider trading, while banning priceincreasing insider trading, is likely the majoritarian default rulei.e., the approach most corporate managers and investors would
negotiate were they able to do so.
A.

GreaterBenefits from Price-DecreasingInsider Trading

Somewhat curiously, legal scholars have paid little attention to
the difference between stock overvaluation and undervaluation.41
Professor Marcel Kahan, for example, ignored the distinction in
setting forth
a somewhat
elaborate
taxoomy
f sock
rice"
.42 and otherwise exhaustive
taxonomy of stock price inaccuracies.
Acknowledging that stock
prices can exhibit different types of inaccuracy and that securities
policy should distinguish between these inaccuracies, Kahan
classified inaccuracies in terms of cause (what caused the pricing
inaccuracy?),43 manifestation (how did the mispricing qualitatively
manifest itself?), 44 and scope (what was the magnitude of the
mispricing?). 45 Nowhere in his helpful and complex taxonomy did
Kahan consider the relevance of direction-i.e., whether the price
was inaccurately great or inaccurately small.
Instead, he
apparently assumed that overvaluation by a certain degree is
equivalent, in terms of effect, to undervaluation by that same
degree.46 Similarly, Professor Lynn A. Stout's work down-playing
the costs of stock price inaccuracy has assumed that overly high
stock prices create essentially the same problems as stock prices
41. A share of common stock entitles its holder to a pro rata share of the

corporation's "free cash flow," or cash flow that is not needed for current or
future operations. Accordingly, the true value of a stock is the present value of
the future payments the shareholder expects to receive, discounted for nondiversifiable risk (i.e., risk that cannot be eliminated by holding a diversified
portfolio of stocks). See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 72 (5th ed. 1996); Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price
Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV.

331, 345 (2003) (defining a share of stock's "actual value" at any point in time as
"the aggregate future stream of income-dividends and other distributionspaid out from then on to whoever holds the share over the lifetime of the firm
(discounted to present value)"). A stock is overvalued if its market price is
higher than this value and undervalued if this value exceeds the stock's market
price.
42. See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate"
Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 987-88 (1992).

43. Id. at 988.
44. Id. at 994.

45. Id. at 999.
46. Id. at 1000.
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47
that are too low.

This assumption is wrong.
As explained below, stock
overvaluation tends to cause greater investor harm than
undervaluation. Accordingly, insider trading that reduces the price
of overvalued equity will provide greater investor benefits than
insider trading that increases the price of undervalued equity. The
following
discussion
explains
why equity overvaluation is more
likey
occr
t ad
•48.
likely to occur and persist, is more difficult to correct, 49 and is likely
to cause greater investor harm than equity undervaluation.
1. Overvaluation Is More Likely to Occur and Persist than
Undervaluation
Stock prices may deviate from fundamental value for several
reasons.5 1 First, prices may be inaccurate because of nonpublic
information. Given that stock prices ultimately reflect expected
future cash flows, 5 2 and traders' expectations are based on publicly

available information, the concealment or nondisclosure of material
information regarding a company's future prospects may result in
an inaccurate stock price.
So, for example, if a mining company
has discovered a major ore strike but no one outside the company
knows about the discovery, the stock price of the company, failing to
incorporate the news that the company stands to make more money
in the future because of the ore discovery, will be inaccurately low.'
Stock price inaccuracies may also result from investor
misassessment of public information (i.e., from investors improperly
47. Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic
Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV.

613, 640-43 (1988) (focusing on efficient capital allocation as primary social
benefit of accurate stock prices and drawing no distinction between
overvaluation and undervaluation).
48. Infra notes 51-87, 94-120 and accompanying text.
49. Infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
50. Infra notes 121-217 and accompanying text.
51. Kahan, supra note 42, at 988 (cataloguing reasons stock prices may
deviate from fundamental values).
52. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
53. Kahan, supra note 42, at 988. Even adherents of the semi-strong
version of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis admit that concealment or
nondisclosure of material information may result in stock prices that fail to
reflect the true value of the underlying securities. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey,
Efficient CapitalMarkets, CorporateDisclosure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV.

394, 418 (2004) (noting that "material nonpublic information" is "not included in
the 'semi-strong' form of efficiency").
54. Cf.SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding
that, in a similar fact scenario, an employee who withholds such information
"must abstain from trading in or recommending securities concerned while such
inside information remains undisclosed").
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weighing public information in determining their willingness to pay
for the stock at issue);5 5 from speculative trading (i.e., from investors
determining willingness-to-pay, not by their beliefs about the
intrinsic value of the stock, but by their beliefs about what others
will be willing to pay for the stock in the future); 6 or from liquidity
crunches (i.e., the price-affecting surpluses and shortages that occur
when investors engage in speculative trading). 57
For each of these sources of inaccuracy, information is the
antidote. This point should be obvious for inaccuracies caused by
nonpublic information, but it is true for the other sources of
inaccuracy as well. Misassessment errors can be corrected if those
with superior assessment skills-i.e., securities analysts and
corporate managers, who know the business best-educate the
investing public as to why the stock at issue is mispriced. Periods of
speculative trading, which tend to be rather short-lived in any
event, can be halted if managers or analysts inform enough traders
that the speculation-driven stock price is diverting from true value
and is likely to return to a more accurate level. And, of course,
mispricing created by a liquidity crunch will be corrected by an

55. Kahan, supra note 42, at 989 ("[A] select group of especially skillful
investors may arrive at an assessment of fundamental stock value that is
consistently more precise than the share price determined by the stock
market."). Note that while this is a possibility, aggregate assessments of worth
are normally more accurate than individual assessments of value. See JAMES
SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CRowDs 3-39 (2004) (presenting an accessible and
highly entertaining assertion of this position); Sanford Grossman, On the
Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where
Information, 31 J. FIN. 573, 573 (1976).

Traders Have Diverse

56. Kahan, supra note 42, at 990-92. John Maynard Keynes famously
articulated this point in his amusing beauty contest analogy:
[Pirofessional investment may be likened to those newspaper
competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six
prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded
to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average
preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has
to pick, not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those
which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors,
all of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of view. It
is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one's judgment, are
really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely
thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we
devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects
the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practice
the fourth, fifth, and higher degrees.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND

MONEY 156 (1936).

57.

Kahan, supra note 42, at 992-93.
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information campaign that halts the speculative trading causing the
liquidity crunch.
Given that a lack of information is behind practically all
instances of stock mispricing, it should not be at all surprising that
the bulk of securities mispricing occurs in the direction of
overvaluation rather than undervaluation. 58 Equity overvaluation is
more likely to occur and persist than undervaluation because the
entities most likely to provide the information that would correct
mispricing-corporate managers and stock analysts-are much
more likely to do so, and have better tools for doing so, when the
mispricing is in the negative direction.
a. Management Is Less Likely to Correct Overvaluation.
While scholars have articulated persuasive arguments in favor of
the view that corporate managers, seeking to protect their
reputations for trustworthiness, will have a tendency toward
candor, 9 there are numerous reasons to believe that managers will
tend to be systematically optimistic in their portrayals of their
corporation's business, and will thus be less likely to correct
overpricing than underpricing. As Professor Donald C. Langevoort
has explained, corporate managers confront a number of biases and
information flow difficulties that, taken together, lead them to
highlight price-increasing information while suppressing priceMoreover, even if managers were
decreasing information. °
motivated to correct overvaluation, they might not be able to do so,
58. See Mark T. Finn et al., Equity Mispricing: It's Mostly on the Short
Side, 55 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 117 (1999). Utilizing data on price earnings ratios
and the level of firm repurchases and issuances of new stock, the authors
identified two portfolios of mispriced stocks, one undervalued and one
overvalued. Id. at 119-20. Whereas the undervalued stocks modestly
outperformed the market, the overvalued stocks dramatically underperformed.
Id. at 120-23. As the article's title indicates, the authors thus concluded that
stock mispricing is "mostly on the short side."
59. Cf Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions:A Behavioral Theory of
Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social
Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101,

106 (1997) (noting that, according to

conventional economic analysis, "the interests of the company's highest
executives are usually (albeit not always) fairly closely aligned with the ongoing
interests of the firm, so that the question of why senior managers would engage
in secondary-market deception remains an interesting one"); id. at 112 ("Senior
management's group interests are contractually aligned with the long-term
success of the firm as reflected in its share price, and the firm benefits from a
reputation for honesty."). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV.

669, 673-77 (1984) (describing management's
trustworthiness).
60. See Langevoort, supra note 59, at 114-56.

interest

HeinOnline -- 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1061 2006

in

its

own

1062

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

for overvaluation is more difficult to correct than undervaluation.6 1
i.

Last

Period

and

Multiple

Audience

Problems.

Corporate managers may fail to be forthcoming with stock pricecorrecting bad news because they face "last period" and "multiple
audience" problems.
The last period problem exists when the
undisclosed news is so bad that it might cause insolvency or some
kind of managerial shake-up.'
If senior managers think the
undisclosed bad news will result in company insolvency or in their
being fired or demoted, they may decide that the costs to them of
misleading disclosures (or omissions) are less than the costs to them
of candor. 63 Thus, they may forego candor when they possess pricedecreasing information, whereas they almost certainly would not do
so if the undisclosed news were price-increasing.
The multiple audience problem results from the fact that
corporate managers cannot make targeted disclosures of negative
information only to shareholders. When managers make a corporate
disclosure, they inform not only shareholders, but also other
corporate constituencies, such as consumers, employees, and
suppliers.6 4
They may, therefore, conceal price-decreasing
information in order to protect relationships with those
constituencies, even though doing so may injure the firm's
relationship with investors, thereby raising the cost of capital, etc.65
ii. Cognitive and Motivational Biases That Produce
Excessive Optimism.
The last period and multiple audience

61. See Jensen, supra note 1, at 14-17 (explaining why measures that
typically correct undervaluation cannot correct overvaluation).
62. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for
Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691,

724-27 (summarizing data showing that fraud on the market generally occurs
when agents are afraid they are in their last period of employment); see also
Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are ShareholderSuits in ShareholderInterests?,

82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1760 n.80 (1994) (endorsing the view of Arlen and Carney).
63. Langevoort, supra note 59, at 114 ("If the senior management group
believes that it faces the threat of company insolvency, with the high
probability of group firing, then it will see the tradeoff for not lying as one of the
threatened loss of salary, bonuses, and perquisites, plus any personal
reputational damage resulting from such a termination."); Arlen & Carney,
supra note 62, at 693 ("Fraud on the Market usually occurs when agents fear
themselves to be in their last period of employment.").
64. Langevoort, supra note 59, at 116 ("When a company issues a press
release, there are many different groups of audience, and no public form of
communication is capable of simultaneously delivering one message to investors
while sending a completely different message to another group.").
65. Id. at 117 (noting that "fake optimism," which seems puzzling if viewed
only in terms of investor relations, "is not so puzzling if we see the false
publicity as directed to other audiences," such as retailers and customers).
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problems explain why even wholly rational managers sometimes
Irrational
refrain from revealing price-decreasing information.
optimism among managers would, of course, exacerbate the
Evidence from cognitive psychology suggests that
situation.
managers may be subject to cognitive and motivational biases66 that
manifest themselves in an irrational tendency to discount negative
corporate developments and to be falsely optimistic about their
firms' chances of success.
a. Confirmatory and Commitment Biases. Cognitive
psychologists have observed that individuals who must process a
large volume of information frequently adopt heuristics, or mental
shortcuts, to assist them with that task. 67 Often, those heuristics
involve the creation of coherent "stories" into which the individuals
attempt to "fit" the information they receive.68 Confronted with
sufficient inconsistent information, individuals will eventually
revise their stories to fit the evidence, but such revision requires the
use of scarce cognitive resources and is disfavored. Thus, in an
attempt to process information as efficiently as possible, individuals
will unconsciously tend to construe information and events in a
manner that confirms their prior beliefs, attitudes, and
impressions. 69 For corporate managers, this tendency may result in
66. Cognitive biases result from the fact that individuals are simply
incapable of processing the tremendous amount of information available to
them (i.e., their rationality is "bounded"). Those biases manifest themselves as
mental shortcuts, or "heuristics," designed to permit individuals to process the
vast quantities of information they encounter. Id. at 134 n.113 ("[Cognitive
biases] exist simply to manage complexity and make action possible in a world
of bounded rationality."). Motivational biases, by contrast, do not directly assist
in cognition but instead help an individual achieve some (perhaps latently)
desired end other than mere cognition. Id. ("[Motivational] biases exist because
they serve some adaptive function not grounded in rationality, and thus are the
more likely source of mythic beliefs.").
67. Id. at 135 ("A well-documented tendency of people who must operate in
noisy informational environments is to adopt heuristic forms of thought.").
68. See id. ("Commonly, people build schemas to provide them with 'best
available' interpretations.").
69. See id. ("When given enough motivation, people will revise their
schemas to reflect new information. But processing limits lead to a bias against
revision: The normal cognitive strategy is to construe information and events in
such a way as to confirm prior attitudes, beliefs, and impressions."). This
confirmatory bias, described in the text as a cognitive bias, may have
motivational bases as well. At the individual level, revising a story causes
anxiety, particularly if the revised story indicates that prior beliefs were
mistaken and/or that plans for the future should be revisited. See id. at 136
("Revising a schema is anxiety-provoking, especially if it opens up a host of
troubling possibilities."). Accordingly, individuals may be unconsciously averse
to evaluating evidence in a way that calls on them to revise their own stories.
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a "commitment" bias7 ° under which the managers strongly resist
evidence that previously selected courses of action were ill-chosen.7'
The upshot of the confirmatory and commitment biases, of course, is
that managers will tend to view new information as confirming prior
beliefs and the wisdom of past decisions-which means that they
will tend to evaluate new information optimistically.
b. Illusion of Control. A second optimism bias stems
from the fact that managers officially "control" corporate endeavors.
There is substantial empirical support in the psychology literature
for the proposition that individuals systematically overrate their
own abilities and achievements. 2 And, of course, if people overrate
their own abilities, they will tend to overestimate the likelihood that
With respect to group decision making (the sort that generally occurs in

business organizations), story revision is disfavored because of the threat it
poses to group cohesiveness. The need to revise a story implies that the group,
or, more likely, some portion thereof, was wrong in the past. Thus, group
members will have to undergo the stability-threatening process of assigning
blame, reallocating responsibilities, etc. Because they typically desire to avoid
these stresses, group members will unconsciously tend to construe information
in a story-confirming fashion. Id. at 138.
70. Langevoort treats the confirmatory and commitment biases as different
biases. See id. at 135-38, 143. The distinction makes sense if the confirmatory
bias is viewed as a cognitive bias (designed to permit the decisionmaker to
process large volumes of information) and the commitment bias as a
motivational bias (designed to avoid the stresses and other negative effects
associated with changing course). See supra note 66 (defining cognitive and
motivational biases). As noted, however, and as recognized by Langevoort, the
confirmatory bias may be conceived of as a motivational bias as well. See
Langevoort, supra note 59, at 136; supra note 69. So conceived, its resemblance
to the commitment bias is striking. For present purposes, then, it is sufficient
to lump the biases together, for both manifest themselves in a reluctance to
change course and therefore result in a tendency to view new information in a
decision-confirming (i.e., optimistic) fashion.
71. See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock et al., Social and Cognitive Strategies for
Coping with Accountability: Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J.

PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 632, 638 (1989) (noting that subjects who
committed themselves to particular positions were more concerned with selfjustification and engaged in less self-criticism).
The confirmatory and
commitment biases may result in managers "throwing good money after bad."
For example, some scholars have argued that the commitment bias is a primary
cause of the chronic overcapacity that is common in industry. See Edward J.
Zajac & Max H. Bazerman, Blind Spots in Industry and Competitor Analysis:
Implications of Interfirm (Mis)perceptions for Strategic Decisions, 16 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 37, 45-47 (1991) (noting that firms may irrationally escalate

commitment to expand capacity).
72. Langevoort, supra note 59, at 139 ("One of the most robust findings in
the literature on individual decision making is that of the systematic tendency
of many people to overrate their own abilities, contributions, and talents.").

HeinOnline -- 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1064 2006

2006]

SOVERVALUED EQUITY

1065

decisions they made were "right" and will lead to desirable results.73
The implication in terms of managerial optimism should be clear:
managers tend to believe they control their businesses' affairs, and
they therefore tend to overestimate their businesses' prospects for
success.7 4 Moreover, this bias toward optimism is likely stronger in
business organizations than elsewhere, for optimists tend to be
favored in the hiring process 5 and in promotion decisions."
Whereas selfc. General Self-Serving Beliefs.
aggrandizement is an indirect end of the confirmatory, commitment,
and control biases,77 some patterns of inference pursue selfpromotion more directly. The self-serving inference, well-recognized
by cognitive psychologists, manifests itself in a general tendency to
"see what one wants to see."78 What one wants to see, of course, is
something that is in her self-interest and is not threatening to her
self-esteem or career prospects.7 9 Thus, as Langevoort explains,
"Management groups may subconsciously perceive information in a
way, if at all possible, that permits them to maintain consistency
73. See MAx H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 33
(4th ed. 1998) (discussing overconfidence among managers and summarizing
experiment in which a sample of people who expressed near total certainty that
their judgments were right (1000-to-1 odds) were in fact right only about 81% to
88% of the time).
74. See J.B. Heaton, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 2002
FIN. MAN. 33, 33, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=71411 ("[P]eople are
more optimistic about outcomes that they believe they can control. Consistent
with this first experimental finding, survey evidence indicates that managers
underplay inherent uncertainty, believing that they have large amounts of
control over the firm's performance. .. ").
75. See Langevoort, supra note 59, at 140 (noting that "[o]ptimists are
prized in the hiring process" and observing that numerous corporations utilize
hiring tests designed by a leading research psychologist to assess high levels of
optimism).
76. See id. ("[Tihere is good reason to believe that the tournament-like
competition for promotion up the executive ladder overweights optimism and its
associated behavioral traits, inflating such behavior toward the top of the
hierarchy.").
77. Under the confirmatory and commitment biases, prior beliefs and
decisions are elevated, suggesting that the decisionmaker was wise in the past.
The illusion of control is manifested in beliefs that the decisionmaker controls
things and does so well and is therefore praiseworthy.
78. See Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of
Differential Decision Criteriafor Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 568, 568 (1992) (analyzing "the notion that
people are less skeptical consumers of desirable than undesirable information");
see also THOMAS GILOVICH, How WE KNow WHAT ISN'T So 75-87, 76 (1991)
(discussing the "tendency for people to believe ... what they want to believe").
79. Langevoort, supra note 59, at 144.
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with their self-image of efficacy and control, thereby justifying (to
themselves and others) preservation of their positions and status."8 °
This implies that management will tend to ignore negative (pricedecreasing) information or irrationally spin it positively.
Taken together, the confirmatory, commitment, control, and
general self-serving biases will tend to prevent even fully informed
managers from accurately perceiving (and thus from accurately
disclosing) price-decreasing
information. 8'
Perhaps more
importantly, managers cannot reveal information of which they are
not aware, and they are less likely to learn of price-decreasing
information than of price-increasing information.
iii. CorporateInformation Flow and ManagerialIgnorance.
Much of the information concerning the success of a firm's
endeavors-particularly non-quantifiable, "soft" information, such
as the degree of consumer enthusiasm for new products, the
progress of products through the research and development pipeline,
etc.-is not immediately available to the firm's senior managers.
Instead, the agents with the most direct access to this information
tend to be non-managerial employees and low- to mid-level
managers.82 Senior managers, then, must rely on their underlings to
provide them with information regarding crucial aspects of the
firm's prospects.
The "upward" information flow from nonmanagerial employees and middle-managers to top management
poses a difficult problem for large business organizations,
which
83
must devise means for ensuring orderly information flow.

80. Id.
81. One might wonder, of course, why market forces would not weed out
those corporations (or those managers) that tend toward false optimism. See id.
at 148 ("[Slhould we not expect those firms with unrealistic belief systems that
do not learn from their errors to disappear, leaving only those that have
successfully countered the problem of cognitive bias?"). Langevoort suggests
that these managerial biases may persist, despite the competitive environments
in which businesses operate, because "punishment" of irrational firms takes too
long to provide effective discipline. See id. at 151 (noting that "because of
variations in the intensity of competition, we cannot assume that firms with
bias-filled cultures will necessarily die quickly" and that therefore "biases may
persist for unusually long periods of time"). He also suggests the biases may be
adaptive. See id. at 152-56 ("Put simply, there is reason to suspect that firms
that inculcate certain types of [optimistic] belief systems may in many settings
be competitively superior to those that are more doggedly 'realistic."').
82. See, e.g., Jane E. Dutton et al., Reading the Wind: How Middle
Managers Assess the Context for Selling Issues to Top Managers, 18 STRATEGIC

MGMT. J. 407, 407 (1997) ("It is often middle managers rather than the top
managers who have their hands on the 'pulse of the organization'....").
83. See Manne, supra note 25, at 14 ("Top-level managers are regularly
beset with enormous problems of getting appropriate, truthful, and timely
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The problem is that there is a danger at each stage of the
information-relay system that material information will be
suppressed or exaggerated in some fashion, as each informationprovider will be tempted to tweak his message to conform to his selfinterest.84 Seeking promotion or other rewards, he has an incentive
to inform his superiors of every bit of value-enhancing information
of which he is aware.8 ' By contrast, if he knows his endeavors are
not going as well as expected, he may positively spin that
information or keep it to himself in the hope that things will turn
around soon.86 By the time the price-affecting information reaches
the senior managers in charge of corporate disclosure, it is likely to
have been "massaged" so as to make underlings look good.87 In other
information for making decisions ....

");

see also KENNETH J.

ARROW,

THE LIMITS

OF ORGANIZATION 33-43 (1974) (discussing difficulties of information flow within

organizations); MERRITT B. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A
DYNAMIC ECONOMY 118 (1987) ("Ideas relating to the ... financial decisions of
top management ... are likely to be processed as they make their way toward
the top managers of a firm."); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered
ParticipatoryManagement: An OrganizationalFailures Analysis, 23 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 979, 1013-14 (1998) (summarizing types of information-transmission
problems corporate managers confront).
84. See Langevoort, supra note 59, at 120 ("[I]f material information must
pass through a number of relay points in a hierarchy, the message can change
(and lose accuracy) in the process.").
85. See id. at 121 (noting that "[c]ompensation is often subjective and set by
the immediate supervisor," so that "the natural reporting temptation is to
transmit information in a way that minimizes the potential for blaming oneself
for bad news, and to convey as much good news as possible to the extent that
the information can be attributed to the source--consistent, of course, with a
general desire to have a reputation for credibility with one's superiors"); see also
Martha S. Feldman & James G. March, Information in Organizationsas Signal
and Symbol, 26 ADMIN. ScI. Q. 171, 176 (1981) ("Information is gathered and
communicated in a context of conflict of interest and with consciousness of
potential decision consequences. Often, information is produced in order to
persuade someone to do something.").
86. The danger that underlings will keep negative information to
themselves is heightened in firms that have attempted to achieve orderly
information flow by instructing underlings to distinguish between the unusual
and the usual and to limit information flow to the former. See Roy Radner,
Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1382, 1403-04
(describing the reporting rule of "management by exception"). An underling
who may choose which information is unusual may exercise this discretion to
suppress negative information.
87. See Dutton et al., supra note 82, at 409 ("[Pleople tend to control ...
information about themselves that will affect others' perceptions of them."); see
also R. Joseph Monsen, Jr. & Anthony Downs, A Theory of Large Managerial
Firms, 73 J. POL. ECON. 221, 236 (1965) (asserting that "[mianagers are
'economic men' who desire to maximize their own lifetime incomes" and that
large firms develop bureaucratic structures that "tend to .. . provide biased
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words, it is likely to be positively biased. Unaware of negative
information, the senior managers in charge of corporate disclosures
can neither directly disclose the bad news nor factor it into their
more general forecasts.
iv. Difficulty of Correction. Even if corporate managers
were as likely to perceive overvaluation as undervaluation and were
equally motivated to correct both forms of mispricing, they would be
more likely to correct undervaluation than overvaluation because
they have more effective means of doing so. Consider a manager
confronted with evidence that her company is undervalued. She
might issue a press release explaining why the market was
undervaluing her firm, or she could initiate a stock repurchase,
thereby signaling management's strong belief that the stock is
undervalued. 8 Managers finding undervalued equity to be a chronic
problem could adopt equity-based compensation schemes for
executives (e.g., payment in stock or stock options).89
A manager confronting overvalued equity, by contrast, is
somewhat strapped. As a practical matter, managerial candor is not
an option, for a manager who directly announced to the market that
his corporation's stock was overpriced probably would not keep his
job for very long. 90 Nor could the manager correct the mispricing by
engaging in a sale transaction that would send the reverse signal of
a stock repurchase. Whereas the signal sent by a stock buy-back is
relatively unambiguous, a sale transaction designed to signal
information to top management which reflects its own desires and ideas too
strongly") (emphasis omitted).
88. See Ok-Rial

Song, Hidden Social Costs of Open Market Share

Repurchases, 27 J. CORP. L. 425, 445 (2002) ("[Slince a stock buyback
announcement signals management's information about their company's
undervaluation, the stock price rises in response to revelation of this
information.").
89. Cf John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and
Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 275-76 (2004)

(observing that equity-based compensation, which grew as a percentage of the
compensation of CEOs of public corporations from five percent in 1990 to over
sixty percent in 1999, "induce[s] management to obsess over their firm's day-today share price").
90. Jensen contends that boards of directors would not take kindly to
managerial candor aimed at correcting overvaluation. He explains:
How could [a manager of an overvalued firm] argue to [his] board that
a major effort must be made to reduce the price of the stock? In the
last 10 years there has simply been no listening in boards for this
problem. The likely result for any CEO in this situation is that the
board would respond by saying: "If you cannot do it we will get
someone who can."
Jensen, supra note 1, at 10.
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overvaluation (e.g., an equity offering or a sale of treasury shares
the corporation previously purchased) is much noisier. It could
easily be interpreted as a means of raising capital for some sort of
corporate undertaking. And, of course, equity-based compensation,
which helps prevent undervaluation, exacerbates overvaluation by
inducing managers to drive the share price higher even when they
know the company is overvalued. 91 Finally, the market for corporate
control, which provides a final stop-gap against undervaluation,"
cannot remedy overvaluation. As Professor Michael C. Jensen has
observed, "[i]t is difficult, to say the least, to buy up an overvalued
company, eliminate its overvaluation, and make a profit."93 Thus,
there is an asymmetry in the degree to which managers and market
forces are able to correct the different species of mispricing: the
primary options available for correcting negative mispricing are not
practically available when the mispricing is in the positive direction.
b.
Analysts Are Less Likely to Correct Overvaluation.
Managers, of course, are not the only potential source of pricecorrecting information about a company whose stock is mispriced.
Professional stock analysts make a career out of discovering
instances of over or undervaluation and advising their clients to
trade accordingly.94
These highly skilled analysts are afforded
tremendous access to corporate information and thus ought to be
able to identify and inform the market of overvaluation.95
Empirical evidence indicates, though, that analysts' projections

91. See id. at 14 ("[E]quity-based incentives are like throwing gasoline on a
fire-they make the problem [of overvaluation] worse, not better.").
92. Id. ("The market for corporate control solved many of the problems of
undervalued equity in the 1970s and 1980s through hostile takeovers, leveraged
buyouts, and management buyouts.").
93. Id.
94. All the major Wall Street brokerage firms and investment banks
employ teams of equity analysts, called "sell-side" analysts because they work
for brokerage firms rather than institutional clients such as mutual funds and
hedge funds, who are charged with monitoring the performance of major
companies and reporting on their potential investment value. See John R.
Kroger,

Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An

Enron Prosecutor's

Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 98 n.198 (2005) (describing role of sell-side
analysts).
The analysts make concrete and specific investment
recommendations for the stocks they cover. The most common rating system
involves five recommendations: "strong buy," "buy," "hold," "sell," and "strong
sell." Id. at 99 n.199.
95. See id. at 99 ("Wall Street equity analysts typically have numerous
opportunities to question management about their corporations, through
quarterly management conference calls, annual analyst meetings, and frequent
interactions with the corporation's investor relations staff.").
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are optimistically biased,96 and recent stock market events suggest
that analysts are not very effective at publicizing overvaluation.
Consider, for example, analysts' treatment of Enron Corporation,
whose bankruptcy on December 2, 2001, was, at the time, the
largest ever.97 In the fall of 2001, each of the fifteen largest Wall
Street firms covering Enron's stock had buy recommendations in
place. 9 As late as October 26, 2001-after Enron's CFO had been
forced to resign,99 the SEC had initiated an Enron investigation, 100
and the Wall Street Journal had run several stories about Enron's
earnings management problems'01-ten of the fifteen largest Wall

96. See, e.g., David N. Dreman & Michael A. Berry, Analyst Forecasting
Errors and Their Implications for Security Analysis, 51 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 30
(1995); Scott E. Stickel, PredictingIndividual Analyst EarningsForecasts,28 J.

409 (1990). The optimism bias to which analysts are subject
is vividly illustrated by events that occurred at Merrill Lynch between 1999 and
2002. See Affidavit of Eric R. Dinallo in Support of Application for an Order
Pursuant to General Business Law Section 354 (April 2002) (affidavit of
Assistant Attorney General of State of New York in Spitzer v. Merrill Lynch et
al.), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf.
Without explanation, Merrill Lynch's Internet Research Group decided to stop
issuing "reduce" and "sell" recommendations. Id. at 8-10. Moreover, Merrill
analysts issued highly positive recommendations on stocks they were
contemporaneously describing internally as "piece[s] of crap," "piece[s] of junk,"
and "piece[s] of shit." Id. at 13.
97. See BankruptcyData.com, The 15 Largest Bankruptcies 1980-Present,
http://www.bankruptcydata.com/Research/15-Largest.htm (last visited Nov. 20,
2006). Enron's bankruptcy was eventually eclipsed by that of WorldCom, Inc.
some eight months later. Id.
ACCOUNTING RES.

98.

STAFF OF THE S.

COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

107TH CONG.,

SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 55
(Comm. Print 2002). Professor John Coffee maintains that the analysts should
have known better:
[Als of December 31, 2000, Enron already had a stock price that was
seventy times earnings and six times its book value, and had earned
an 89% return for the year (despite a 9% decrease over the same
period for the S&P 500 index). Such a profile should have alerted any
analyst who was even half awake to the possibility that Enron was
seriously overvalued.
FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE

John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
FashioningRelevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 316 (2004).

99. Enron CFO Andy Fastow was forced to resign from his position on
October 24, 2001. See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS
IN THE ROOM 377 (2003).
100. The SEC began an informal inquiry into Enron's earnings management
on October 17, 2001. Enron publicly announced the informal probe on October
22, 2001, and its stock price immediately sank twenty percent. Id. at 371-72.
101. Beginning on October 17, 2001, the Wall Street Journal ran a series of
articles suggesting that Enron's financial statements were misleading. See
John Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Enron Jolt: Investments, Assets Generate
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Street firms covering Enron maintained buy recommendations, 102 as
did fifteen of seventeen top Wall Street analysts surveyed by
Thompson Financial/First Call. 103
And Enron was no outlier.
Indeed, the ratio of buy to sell recommendations has recently been
as high as 100-to-I,' and in the period immediately preceding a
60% drop in the NASDAQ, only 0.8% of analysts' recommendations
were sell or strong sell.1"' Thus, the evidence suggests that analysts,
quick to report undervaluation by issuing buy recommendations, are
less responsive to mispricing in the positive direction.
How could analysts fail so miserably in identifying and
informing the market of overvaluation? The most plausible answer
is that stock analysts, like corporate managers, face a set of
incentives that systematically biases them toward optimism.' 6 Most
stock analysts are employed by firms that make the lion's share of
their money by providing brokerage and investment banking
services.' 7 The brokerage side of those firms benefits when stocks
Big Loss, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2001, at Cl; Rebecca Smith & John R.
Emshwiller, Enron CFO's PartnershipHad Millions in Profit, WALL ST. J., Oct.
19, 2001, at Cl; Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Partnership Spurs
Enron Equity Cut, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2001, at Cl; Rebecca Smith & John R.
Emshwiller, SEC Seeks Information on Enron Dealings with Partnerships
Recently Run by Fastow, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2001, at A3.
102. Kroger, supra note 94, at 102.
103. Susanne Craig & Jonathan Weil, Heard on the Street: Most Analysts
Remain Plugged In to Enron, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2001, at Cl; see also Kroger,
supra note 94, at 102 n.213.
104. Coffee, supra note 98, at 316-17.
105. Gene D'Avolio et al., Technology, Information Production, and Market
Efficiency 14 (Harvard Inst. for Economic Research, Discussion Paper 1929,
2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=286597.
106. In addition to these incentive-based biases toward optimism, analysts
might confront selection biases or cognitive biases that push them to view a
company's prospects optimistically. Selection bias may be a problem if analysts
follow only stocks that they recommend and refrain from issuing forecasts on
stocks they do not like. See generally Maureen McNichols & Patricia C.
O'Brien, Self-Selection and Analyst Coverage, 35 J. ACCOUNTING RES. 167 (1997)
(finding that stock analysts add coverage of stocks when their information is
favorable and drop coverage when their information is unfavorable). Cognitive
bias may be a problem if an analyst becomes too attached to a stock she covers,
or too committed to a positive story she once told about a then-hot stock. See
Harrison Hong, Seeing Through the Seers of Wall Street: Analysts' Career
Concerns and Biased Forecasts (May 2004) (Princeton Working Paper),
available at http://www.princeton.edu/-hhong/seers.pdf (noting possibility of
selection and cognitive/behavioral biases but concluding that primary source of
analyst bias is career concern).
107. While there are "non-affiliated" analysts who have no relation with
investment banks, they play a relatively minor role in advising investors. Some
have questioned whether the market would support analysts if not for the role
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change hands, and optimistic "buy" recommendations, which may be
acted upon by a larger group of investors, are more likely to
generate trading activity than "sell" recommendations. 1 08 More
importantly, the more lucrative investment banking side of a
brokerage firm's business'0 9 benefits from optimistic analyst
reports." °
Issuers of securities want to make sure that the analysts
they played in selling securities. Consider, for example, the remarks of David
M. Becker, then General Counsel of the SEC:
It's also an open question in my mind whether the public wants to pay
what it costs to get analysts whose bias is beyond question. Some
independent research firms are thriving. Still, I would be interested
in finding out whether truly independent analysis is a bit like legroom
in an airplane. Everyone likes it; people complain about the lack of it;
but when push comes to shove there aren't that many people willing
to pay for it.
David M. Becker, Gen. Counsel, SEC, Remarks Before the Committee on
Federal Regulation of Securities of the American Bar Association: Analyzing
Analysts 4 (Aug. 7, 2001) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch510.htm; see also Kroger, supra note 94, at 103 ("There is, however, no real
direct market for equity research."); Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The
Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 1035, 1045 (2003).

108. One might initially think that any stock recommendation other than a
"hold" would benefit a firm's brokerage business, for a negative
recommendation (e.g., "strong sell") would generate sales by customers who
would utilize brokers. Positive recommendations are more likely, however, to
generate significant brokerage income. Whereas a "buy" or "strong buy"
recommendation can be acted upon by any investor, a "sell" or "strong sell"
recommendation can be acted upon only by individuals who currently own the
stock at issue or are willing to engage in a short sale or to purchase a put
option. Because the latter group is significantly smaller than the former, a
positive recommendation is likely to generate more trading activity, and thus
more brokerage income, than a negative recommendation. See Coffee, supra
note 98, at 317 n.43 ("[A] buy recommendation addresses the entire market and
certainly all the firm's customers, while a sell recommendation addresses only
those customers who own the stock (probably well under one percent) and those
with margin accounts who are willing to sell the stock short."). Thus, analyst
optimism will be favored by firms that have large brokerage operations.
109. Income from brokerage operations is a small and apparently shrinking
portion of the business of most firms that employ analysts; the real money is in
the investment banking side of the business. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 107,
at 1046 ("Because of the elimination of fixed commissions and intense
competition in commission levels, commission revenue currently reflects a
relatively minor component of brokerage-firm revenue. For most major firms,
investment banking revenue is far more significant.").
110. See Kroger, supra note 94, at 103 ("[Blanks and brokers make money
from research indirectly, in two ways: research leads to increased equity
transactions for firm brokers, and it helps firm investment bankers sell their
financial services to major corporations.").

HeinOnline -- 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1072 2006

20061

OVERVALUED EQUITY

1073

employed by their investment bank will drum up investor
enthusiasm for the issue, so as to command the highest price
possible.'
They also want to ensure that the analysts continue to2
support the stock after the offering so that it increases in value.1
Managers thus carefully consider the optimism and enthusiasm of
an investment bank's analysts in determining whom to hire.
Indeed, CEOs report that the reputation of the analyst covering the
relevant industry is an important determinant of their choice of an
underwriter for their companies' initial public and seasoned equity
offerings. 1 3 Analysts' employers therefore have an interest in
assuring that their analysts issue rosy reports." 4
Empirical evidence suggests that the employers have structured
their promotion and compensation schemes accordingly. Attempting
to discover whether analysts that issued optimistic predictions were
rewarded with better jobs or assignments, Professors Harrison Hong
111. See Becker, supra note 107, at 3 ("To be most attractive to a prospective
underwriting client, an analyst has to convince the client that he is enthusiastic
about the issuer's prospects and that he can sow his enthusiasm among
potential investors."); Fisch & Sale, supra note 107, at 1047 ("The issuer wants
coverage from the analyst because a 'rousing endorsement from a highly ranked
analyst' is believed to send the stock of a 'fledging' company into 'orbit.'")
(quoting Jeffrey M. Laderman, Wall Street's Spin Game, Bus. WK., Oct. 5, 1998,
at 148, 152).
112. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 107, at 1047 ("A firm also enhances the
attractiveness of its investment banking services if it can provide continued
analyst coverage that will help to maintain the price of the securities
subsequent to the offering."). One might expect an issuer to be disappointed by
post-offering price appreciation, which would seem to imply that the offering
price was set too low and that the issuer was thus deprived of capital it might
otherwise have raised. Ironically, however, corporations tend to view offerings
as successful if the post-offering stock price increases. See Stout, supra note 47,
at 662 ("[Alnecdotal evidence suggests that management regards an initial
public offering as 'successful' if the price of the issue in the aftermarket rises
substantially above the offering price."). This reasoning may make sense if
managers are issuing stock for reasons other than simply to raise capital as
cheaply as possible; they might, for example, be more concerned with enhancing
their or their firm's status and prestige, with creating a public market for
insiders' shares, or with increasing their firm's ability to acquire other
businesses for stock instead of cash. Id. at 663.
113. Hong, supra note 106, at 2-3.
114. Thus, Morgan Stanley's managing director of corporate finance
famously stated in an internal memorandum:
Our objective is . . .to adopt a policy, fully understood by the entire
Firm, including the Research Department, that we do not make
negative or controversial comments about our clients as a matter of
sound business practice.... Again, the philosophy and practical result
needs to be "no negative comments about our clients."
The Rohrbach Memo: 'No Negative Comments,' WALL ST. J., July 14, 1992, at
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and Jeffrey D. Kubik analyzed the earnings forecasts and
employment histories of 12,000 analysts working for 600 brokerage
houses between 1983 and 2000.115 They found that analysts were
"systematically rewarded for being optimistic as long as the
optimism [was] within a range of accuracy that maintain[ed] the
credibility of [the] analysts." 16 They also found that relatively
optimistic analysts were much less likely to be fired or to leave a top
brokerage house, and were much more likely to be hired by a better
house.'17 They were also given better assignments than their more
pessimistic (realistic?) colleagues. 18 For analysts covering stocks
underwritten by their brokerage houses, the connection between
forecast accuracy and career advancement was significantly more
attenuated, and the dependence of career prospects on forecast
optimism was significantly larger.119 It thus seems that analysts'
personal incentives have been aligned with the incentives of their
employers-i.e.,
to
issue
enthusiastic
and
optimistic
recommendations. Accordingly, analysts cannot be counted on to
provide investors with the "bad news" necessary to correct instances
of overvalued equity. 120
2. Overvaluation Is More Harmful to Investors Than Is
Undervaluation
Of course, it would matter little that managers and analysts are
115. Harrison Hong & Jeffrey D. Kubik, Analyzing the Analysts: Career
Concerns and Biased EarningsForecasts,58 J. FIN. 313, 315 (2003).
116. Hong, supra note 106, at 4 (summarizing the findings of Hong & Kubik,
supra note 115).

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 5.
120. It is no answer to say that the market will see through rosy analyst
reports. As an initial matter, the empirical evidence (although sparse) suggests
that the market does not see through these biased reports. Roni Michaely &
Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of UnderwriterAnalyst
Recommendations, 12 REv. FIN. STUD. 653, 671-78 (1999) (providing empirical

evidence suggesting that market has failed to discount excessive analyst
optimism). Perhaps this is because the sophistication of the marginal investor
is diminishing, see D'Aviolo et al., supra note 105, at 2-3, which decreases the
likelihood that bias will be recognized. The market may eventually learn to
discount analyst optimism (investor sophistication can hardly diminish

indefinitely), but at this point, the marginal investor is apparently somewhat
ignorant of the fact that analyst reports are biased. Ultimately, though,
whether the market will or will not see through rosy analyst reports is
irrelevant to the matter at hand. The point here is that analysts cannot be
counted upon to provide price-decreasing information to correct stock
overvaluation. Even if they do not exacerbate the problem (because the market

discounts what they are saying), they certainly do not help alleviate it.
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unlikely to correct overvaluation, and thus the argument for
liberalizing price-decreasing insider trading would be weak, if
overvaluation caused little harm to investors or to society in general.
And one might initially wonder how overvaluation could cause any
harm to investors, who generally want the market to value the
stocks in their portfolios as highly as possible. It is therefore useful
to examine the harms investors suffer as a result of stock
mispricing. Such examination reveals that equity overvaluation
causes greater investor harm than equity undervaluation.
a. Greater Allocative Inefficiency.
Most commentators
considering the costs of inaccurate stock prices have focused on the
allocative inefficiency caused by mispricing. 121 In a market economy,
decisionmakers look to prices in determining how to allocate
resources to their most highly valued uses.'22 Inaccurate securities
prices are generally considered to be undesirable because they result
in an improper channeling of investment capital. 23
121. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 47, at 640-41 ("Commentators who stop to
address the question [of why informationally efficient markets are desirable]
generally conclude that informational efficiency-which addresses only the
market's speed in adjusting prices to new information-is desirable because it
serves allocative efficiency-the proper allocation of scarce resources among
competing alternate uses."); Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 866 ("The more
accurately prices reflect information, the better prices guide capital investment
in the economy."); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case
for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 734 (1984) (observing
that securities prices are important "not so much because of their distributive
consequences on investors but more because of their effect on allocative
efficiency"); Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and
Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1015
(1984) (noting benefits of accurate prices in efficient market); David J. Schulte,
The Debatable Case for Securities Disclosure Regulation, 13 J. CORP. L. 535,
539-42 (1988) (arguing that securities prices are important because of their
effect on allocative efficiency). But see Stout, supra note 47, at 643-68 (arguing
that benefits of efficient stock prices have been overstated).
122. See Hayek, supra note 34, at 526 (discussing how the price mechanism
leads to an efficient allocation of resources throughout the economy).
123. Consider an economy with two firms-one with high expected future
earnings and the other with the same assets but lower expected future
earnings. More total wealth will be created if money from investors is allocated
to the former firm, which will generate more value in the long run. If stock
prices accurately reflect the discounted expected value of each company's future
earnings, the stock of the former company will be priced higher than that of the
latter, and the former company will raise more money than the latter by selling
the same percentage of its equity. Investment capital will therefore migrate in
the right direction. If, however, stock prices are inaccurate-say, a ten percent
share of the former company is priced the same as a ten percent share of the
latter-then investment resources are unlikely to be channeled to their highest
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While one might initially expect undervaluation and
overvaluation to create allocative inefficiencies of similar
magnitude, overvaluation
likely causes greater allocative
inefficiency than undervaluation.
A firm whose stock is
undervalued can raise the capital it needs to fund expenditures by
tapping funding sources besides the equity markets. 24 For example,
it can raise money through corporate borrowing. While some have
argued that the corporation with a high and rising stock price can
borrow more at a lower cost of capital than the corporation whose
stock is declining, 125 the connection between stock price and
borrowing ability seems tenuous. 126 First, managers of firms with
undervalued stock prices can explain to lenders why their stock
price is not reflective of future earnings. If they have a compelling
127
story, they should be able to borrow the funds they need.
Moreover, the banking literature indicates that lenders measure
loan risk-and thus determine the amount they are willing to lend
and the interest rate they will charge-by comparing the
corporation's outstanding debt to the value of its assets, not the
market price of its stock.2 In short, managers of a firm whose stock
is undervalued can and likely will correct the problem with capital
providers and will eventually get what they need, albeit perhaps at
a higher cost. By contrast, management of an overvalued firm has
no incentive to "correct" the mispricing when dealing with capital
providers, and empirical research (discussed below) indicates that
managers are more likely to cause their firm to issue equity when it
and best use.
124. See Stout, supra note 47, at 645 (noting that "[clorporations can finance
their projects through a number of means other than issuing stock," including
"internally generated revenues" and "[a] host of forms of debt"). Stout adds:
The argument that efficient stock markets are essential to allocate
properly investment capital assumes that, despite a plethora of
alternate financing sources, corporations rely primarily on stock
issues for raising funds. That assumption is at odds with actual
corporate financing behavior. In fact, firms largely appear to avoid
the stock market as a source of funding.
Id. at 645-46.
125.

See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET
81 (1965); HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE

EFFICIENCY

AND ECONOMIC
DISCLOSURE

123

(1979).
126. See Stout, supra note 47, at 648-51 (arguing that stock prices play little
influence in decisions to extend credit).
127. Id. at 649-50 ("The bank that readily lends on the basis of high share
value unsupported by assets or revenues is unlikely to stay in the banking
business long. Nor would rational lenders be deterred by depressed stock prices
if the assets and revenues to support the loan exist.").
128. See id. at 650 & n.202 (citing numerous sources from banking
literature).
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is overvalued.1 29 Thus, overvaluation may ultimately cause greater
allocative inefficiency than undervaluation.
This social cost of overvalued equity, though, is not much of a
"harm" to the shareholders of the mispriced firm. While society as a
whole may be worse off because of the allocative inefficiency
resulting from a firm's overvaluation, that inefficiency results
because the firm is able to raise more money at a given cost than it
ought to be able to raise. 130 Any harm the firm's shareholders
experience by virtue of the allocative inefficiency injected into the
economy as a whole is dwarfed by the immediate benefit they
receive from the firm's enhanced ability to raise capital.13 1 Thus,
concern about inefficient allocation of investment capital occasioned
by their firm's overvaluation likely would not cause shareholders to
value protection from overvaluation.
But shareholders might value such protection, and pay a
premium for it, if overvaluation causes other costs that are
concentrated more completely on shareholders. That appears to be
the case. Recent economic events suggest that stock overvaluation
causes at least three types of inefficiency that, unlike the inefficient
allocation of investment capital, are borne primarily by the
shareholders of an overvalued firm. First, overvaluation increases
the agency costs involved in running a corporation. In addition, it
saddles investors with expected reliance costs that tend to exceed
the expected reliance costs occasioned by equity undervaluation.
Finally, it increases the costs of monitoring managerial
performance.
b.
GreaterAgency Costs. Agency costs are the costs that arise
from individuals' cooperative efforts. 3 2 They appear whenever any
principal hires an agent to act on his behalf, for the agent will

129. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
130. Carlton and Fischel recognized the flip-side of this assertion-i.e., that
accurate stock prices are beneficial to society as a whole, but not necessarily to
individual firms or their investors. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 86667 ("From the perspective of an individual firm, however, efficient capital
markets are a public good, unless private, as opposed to social, gains accrue to
the firm when the prices of its own securities convey accurate information.").
131. While this total benefit is smaller than the total cost associated with
the firm's overvaluation, the shareholders capture all the benefit but
externalize much of the cost. Thus, their individual benefit from overvaluation
likely exceeds, at least in the short-term, the harm they suffer as participants
in the larger economy.
132. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305, 309 (1976) (noting that "agency costs arise in any situation involving
cooperative effort").
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always have an incentive to act opportunistically or to shirk (which
is, of course, a form of opportunism), and the principal must
therefore take steps to prevent or insure against such behavior. 3 '
Agency costs may thus be defined as the sum of the contracting,
monitoring, and bonding costs incurred to reduce the conflicts of
interest between principals and agents, plus the residual loss that
occurs because it is generally impossible to perfectly identify the
interests of agents and their principals."3 In a corporation, agency
costs arise because the directors, officers, and other managers
charged with running the corporation's business have interests that
conflict
with
the
corporation's
residual
claimants,
the
shareholders. 35
While capital markets generally operate as a
powerful tool for minimizing agency costs (because firms that have
developed effective mechanisms for lowering such costs will be most
attractive to investors),
recent economic developments suggest
that, when equity becomes overvalued, securities markets tend to
exacerbate agency costs.
A corporation's expected agency costs are a function of two
factors: the likelihood that managers and investors will have
divergent interests 138 and the magnitude of investor loss that will
139
result if managers put their own interests ahead of investors'.
Because (1) overvaluation is more likely than undervaluation to
cause managers' interests to diverge from those of investors and (2)
the investor loss occasioned by managers' pursuing their own, rather
133. Id. at 308.
134. Id. at 308-09.
135. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of CorporateLaw
and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1325, 1332 (1998) ("If the
managers (the agents of shareholders and the corporation) pursue their own
interests-such as leisure or perks, or their own prestige-rather than the
interests of shareholders (the principal), shareholders suffer the
consequences.").
136. Jensen, supra note 1, at 6 (noting that markets have been viewed as
"potent forces to help control agency costs"). Labor markets also help control
agency costs, for managers who do not pursue their own interests at
shareholder expense will be favored in the inter-firm competition for
managerial talent.
137. Id. (describing '"how securities markets can sometimes create and
exacerbate conflicts of interest between managers and owners rather than
resolve them").
138. The greater the likelihood of diverging interests, the greater the
expected agency costs.
139. Acts of managerial opportunism differ in the degree to which they
create loss for investors. For example, a manager who violates his duty of
loyalty by causing the corporation to give $50,000 to a pet charity creates less
investor loss (i.e., destroys less corporate value) than a manager who causes the
corporation to give $50,000 to a firm that is developing a technology that will
compete with that sold by the investor corporation.
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than investors', interests is likely to be greater when stock
mispricing is in the positive direction, overvaluation is likely to
generate significantly higher agency costs than undervaluation. To
see this point, compare undervalued and overvalued firms in terms
of the likelihood of divergence between managers' and stockholders'
interests and the degree of shareholder loss stemming from
managerial opportunism.
i. Agency Costs in the Undervalued Firm. When a firm's
equity is undervalued, the incentives of shareholders and managers
are likely to be closely aligned: both groups will usually want to
increase stock price so that it reflects fundamental value.
Shareholders will desire this result because price appreciation adds
to their long-term wealth 4 ' and enhances the corporation's overall
health (and thus its value) by making it easier for the firm to raise
large sums of money in the capital markets. Managers will typically
want this result because (1) it is more prestigious to run a company
with a relatively high stock price than one with a relatively low
stock price, 4T (2) their compensation frequently will be tied to stock
price, 42 and (3) the corporation will be more flexible because it can
use its high-priced stock as currency or raise more money for
expansion in the capital markets. 43
Given the overlap in
shareholders' and managers' desires, it is unlikely that
undervaluation will occasion any managerial behavior that diverges
140. Because the wealth accretion occurring when prices are brought up to
the level of actual value is not likely to diminish absent a change in the
fundamental value of the firm, the shareholder wealth effect here is long-term.
Periods of equity overvaluation, by contrast, enhance shareholder wealth only
in the short-term. Such transitory price enhancements are of little value to
medium-term and long-term stockholders. Short-term stockholders may benefit
from transitory increases in price, but only if they are able to time stock sales so
that they sell at the temporarily high price. In practice, this is rather difficult,
for investors must avoid selling too soon (prior to the peak) or too late (after the
transitory price enhancement has ended).
Thus, transitory stock price
increases offer little value to stockholders. Enhancements that drive stock
prices to the level of fundamental value, by contrast, are not likely to be
transitory and are desirable to all shareholders, regardless of the length of time
they intend to hold their stock.
141. See Jensen, supra note 1, at 8 (noting the prestige associated with
managing a company with a high stock price).
142. See Coffee, supra note 89, at 275-76 (noting growth in equity-based
compensation); D'Avolio et al., supra note 105, at 10 (same).
143. Cf Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Stock Market Driven
Acquisitions, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 295, 309 (2003) ("The benefit of having a high
valuation for making acquisitions also points to an incentive to raise a firm's
stock price even through earnings manipulation, a phenomenon whose
prevalence is becoming increasingly apparent.").
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from shareholder interests.
In the unlikely event managers were dissuaded from taking
steps to drive the stock price up to fundamental value,' the
investor loss resulting from such opportunism would be relatively
minor. Some loss could result if the company had to forego
investments because its depressed stock price hampered its ability
to raise money in the equity markets, but the company could always
pursue another form of financing and could likely negotiate a
favorable interest rate by explaining to lenders why the stock price
was artificially depressed. 4 ' Investors would also experience loss in
that their portfolios would be undervalued during the period in
which managers opportunistically failed to correct the depressed
stock price. Such periods, however, would likely be short. Because
undervaluation could usually be corrected by the action of a single
manager, managers would normally have to work in concert to keep
the stock price depressed. This coordinated behavior would be
unlikely to occur naturally, for most managers want to avoid
undervaluation, 46 and persistent undervaluation would therefore
require some sort of collusion among managers. Any such cartel
would be inherently unstable, given the benefits that would likely
accrue to a cheater.'4 7 Thus, any periods of investor wealth
depression occasioned by managers' (improbable) failure to correct
undervaluation are likely to be transitory.
ii. Agency Costs in the Overvalued Firm. The situation is
markedly different when a firm's stock is overvalued. Unlike
undervaluation, overvaluation is likely to create a substantial
divergence in the interests of shareholders and managers, and the
investor loss that will result if managers of overvalued firms pursue
144. Shirking might prevent managers from taking affirmative steps to
correct undervalued stock prices. Or managers might want to keep stock prices
depressed below value if they had short-sold and needed to repurchase. Of
course, management short-selling is highly unlikely when a stock is
undervalued. (For many managers, it is illegal, see Securities Exchange Act
§ 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2000), and those managers for whom it is an option
would not short a stock if they knew its price was depressed below value.)
Moreover, even managers that had sold short would not want to keep the price
depressed indefinitely; they would desire the low price to remain for just long
enough for them to repurchase the stock at the depressed price.
145. See Stout, supra note 47, at 648-50; see also supra notes 126-28 and
accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
147. Investors would love the cheater whose action corrected undervalued
equity; the press would heap praise upon her; the labor market would reward
her with a host of employment opportunities. If she were a stockholder or had
equity-based compensation, her wealth would increase.
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their own interests, rather than those of stockholders, is likely to be
substantial.
a. Greater Divergence in Interests. When a firm's stock
price is overvalued, the interests of shareholders and managers are
likely to diverge. Managers are unlikely to prefer that the stock
price fall to fundamental value, for (as noted) they reap a host of
benefits from a high stock price.148 While most managers will realize
that overvaluation cannot last forever and that price correction is
likely to occur eventually,'4 9 they may nonetheless refrain from
taking steps to reduce price to fundamental value. Their tendencies
toward optimism' 50 will likely lead them to believe either that they
can eventually cause the firm to generate cash flows that will justify
the currently inflated price or that they will be able to exit the
corporation (by resigning their positions and selling their stock)
prior to the inevitable price correction.' 51 Thus, corporate managers
have little incentive to correct equity overvaluation.
On first glance, one might suppose that shareholders would
similarly desire for equity overvaluation to persist; after all, the
higher the stock price, the greater a shareholder's wealth. Because
overvaluation tends to be eventually corrected, however, medium- to
long-term shareholders generally cannot capture the transitory
wealth increase stemming from overvaluation and thus will not care
to extend periods of overvaluation.'5 2 While short-term shareholders
may be able to profit from transitory periods of overvaluation, they

148. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text. As Professor Jensen
has observed, "If you are the CEO or CFO [of an overvalued company], you are
on TV, and covered by the press, investors love you, your options are increasing
in value, and the capital markets are wide open to your firm." Jensen, supra
note 1, at 8.
149. See Langevoort, supra note 59, at 106 ("[I]n most bad-news scenarios,
concealment simply delays the appreciation of the truth rather than avoids it
indefinitely ....
").
150. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
151. For example, accounts of the financial collapse at Enron suggest that
the firm's managers, well aware of the corporation's overvaluation, believed
that they could either turn the company around or exit before collapse.
According to one prominent account:
Enron's accounting games were never meant to last forever.... The
goal was to maintain the impression that Enron was humming until
[CEO Jeff] Skilling's next big idea kicked in and started raking in real
profits.... In Skilling's mind, though, there was no way he was going
to fail. He had always succeeded before, and his successes had
transformed the company. Why would it be any different with EES
and broadband?
MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 171.

152. See supra note 140.
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can do so only if they sell their stock prior to the inevitable price
correction. Such a "bail before correction" strategy is much riskier
for shareholders than for managers, for shareholders know little
about corporate events that may reveal overvaluation and are thus
more likely to delay too long before selling their stock. Moreover,
shareholders possess neither actual nor apparent control over the
events likely to reveal overvaluation and will thus tend to be less
optimistic than managers about their ability to sell their stock
before the inevitable price-correction. 153 Accordingly, even shortterm stockholders will value periods of overvaluation less than
managers will.
In addition, any "upside" experienced by shareholders during
periods of overvaluation is likely to be counteracted by a significant
downside. For reasons detailed below, managers are likely, during
periods of equity overvaluation, to engage in behavior that destroys
real corporate value. Given this probability, stockholders are even
more likely to prefer that managers correct equity overvaluation.
From
Managerial
Losses
b. Greater Investor
Opportunism. Whereas the investor losses stemming from a
managerial failure to correct undervalued equity are likely to be
small," 4 the losses occasioned by overvaluation may be significant.
In essence, managers of overvalued firms are "buying time"-hoping
to trick the market into maintaining the high stock price until they
can exit the firm (both as shareholders and as managers) or can
produce the corporate performance required to justify the stock
price. 155
Such continued trickery requires beating analysts'
expectations, for the capital markets routinely punish firms that fail
to meet such expectations. 5 6 Indeed, one recent study found that
the average stock price of firms beating consensus analyst forecasts
for the quarter rose 5.5% more during the quarter than a sizematched portfolio; by contrast, the average stock price of firms
missing consensus expectations fell by 5.04% more during the
quarter than a size-matched portfolio.1 57 It is therefore crucial that

153. On the optimistic biases created by actual or apparent control over
events, see supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
155. See Jensen, supra note 1, at 8-10 (noting that the objective of managers
of overvalued firms is to "postpone the day of reckoning until [they] are gone or
[they] figure out how to resolve the issue"); see also supra note 151.
156. See Jensen, supra note 1, at 7 ("CEOs and CFOs know that the capital
markets will punish the entire firm if they miss analysts' forecasts by as much
as a penny ....
[Tihe capital markets reward a firm with a premium for
meeting or beating the analysts' expectations during the quarter.").
157. Douglas J. Skinner & Richard G. Sloan, Earnings Surprises, Growth
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managers of an overvalued firm continue to meet or beat analysts'
expectations.
The problem, of course, is that they cannot
perpetually do so by exploiting legitimate value-creating
opportunities. 5 ' Once those options have been exhausted, they will
eventually turn to gimmicks that are designed to produce numbers
that appease the market but actually reduce long-term firm value." 9
Jensen has identified three such gimmicks that are routinely
pursued by managers of overvalued firms:
To appear to be satisfying growth expectations you use your
overvalued equity to make long run value destroying
acquisitions; you use your access to cheap debt and equity
capital to engage in excessive internal spending and risky
negative net present value investments that the market thinks
will generate value; and eventually you turn to further
accounting manipulation and even fraudulent practices to
continue the appearance of growth and value creation.' 60
Consider how these three gimmicks work in concert to destroy
corporate value.
(i). Value-DestroyingAcquisitions. Because corporate
acquisitions create the appearance of growth (and thus may fool the
market for at least a while), corporate managers that have
exhausted other growth options may find such acquisitions
attractive, even if they are ultimately value-reducing. The findings
of a recent study by Professors Sara B. Moeller, Frederick P.
Schlingemann, and Ren6 M. Stulz are consistent with the claim that
equity overvaluation leads managers to pursue value-destroying
acquisitions.'
The authors compared how merger announcements
affected the stock prices of acquiring firms during the 1998-2001
period, a period of significant equity overvaluation, with the
Expectations, and Stock Returns or Don't Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink Your
Portfolio, 7 REV. ACCT. STuD. 289, 297 tbl.1 (2002).

158. See Jensen, supra note 1, at 7 ("Generally, the only way for managers to
meet those expectations year in and year out is to cook their numbers to mask
the inherent uncertainty in their businesses. And that cannot be done without
sacrificing value.").
159. See id. at 8-10 ("You realize the markets will hammer you unless your
company's performance justifies the stock price. So after all value-creating
alternatives have been taken you start to take actions that destroy long run
value that you hope will at least appear to generate the market's expected
performance in the short run.").
160. Id. at 10 (footnotes omitted).
161. Sara B. Moeller, Frederik P. Schlingemann & Ren6 M. Stulz, Wealth
Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the
Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757, 760 (2005).
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acquiring-firm price effects occasioned by merger announcements in
the 1980s.' 62 They found that, for the 1998-2001 period, the value of
acquiring firms declined by a total of $240 billion in the three-day
periods surrounding announcements of acquisitions. 163 During all of
the 1980s, by contrast, the loss in value of acquiring firms during
the three-day period surrounding merger announcements was only
$4.2 billion.16' Moreover, whereas the acquirers' losses in the 1980s
were offset by gains to acquirees, for a net synergy gain of $11.6
billion, such an offset did not occur in the 1998-2001 period; rather,
the losses to acquirers
exceeded acquirees' gains for a net synergy
65
loss of $134 billion.
Equity overvaluation seems to have influenced this value
destruction. The authors found that most of the value losses were
attributable to eighty-seven "large loss" transactions, in which the
loss to each acquiring firm exceeded $1 billion. 66 The bidders in
those transactions appear to have been overvalued: they had
statistically significantly higher Tobin's q and market-to-book ratios
(both proxies for overvaluation) 16 than both the bidders in other
deals during the same time period and all bidders in the period from
1980-1997.
Moreover, a substantially greater proportion of
bidders in large loss deals financed their acquisitions using equity:
71.6% of the bidders in large loss deals did so, as opposed to 35.2% of
other bidders during the same time period and 30.3% of all bidders
in the 1980-1997 period. 69 In short, what the authors term "wealth
destruction on a massive scale" appears to have occurred because
overvalued bidders used their high-priced stock to finance deals
that, from an investor's perspective, should not have been
pursued. 170 Such findings are consistent with Jensen's assertion
162. Id. at 757.
163. Id. at 758-59.
164. Id. at 758, 762 tbl.I.
165. Id. at 762 tbl.I.
166. Id. at 759. The total loss to the bidders' shareholders in these
transactions was $397 billion, which represented an average abnormal return of
-10.6%. Id. The average loss to acquiring-firm shareholders was $2.31 per
dollar spent on the acquisition. Id. at 765.
167. Tobin's q is, in essence, the market value of a firm's assets divided by
the replacement value of those assets. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 41, at 775.
Obviously, the higher this figure, the more overvalued the firm is. Market to
book ratio is the market value of a firm's assets divided by the book value of
those assets. Id. at 774-75. Again, the higher this figure, the more highly
valued is the firm as a going concern.
168. Moeller et al., supra note 161, at 773 tbl.III.
169. Id. at 772 tbl.III (Panel A).
170. See also Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 143, at 297-99 (providing a
model consistent with the observation that overvalued firms engage in
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that equity overvaluation leads to unwise acquisitions that are
designed to dupe the market but will ultimately be revealed, to the
detriment of shareholders. 7 '
(ii). Negative NPV Greenfield Investments and
Avoidance of Positive NPV Investments. Equity overvaluation also
tends to lead managers to reduce firm value by pursuing certain
greenfield investments that have a negative net present value
NPV. 17 2
("NPV") and avoiding other investments that have a positive
As explained below, this occurs because overvaluation effectively
provides managers with additional capital to invest in enterprise
expansion,"' and, since managers receive private benefits from
expansion, they will tend to do so beyond the point that is optimal
for shareholders (i.e., the point at which the firm's value is
maximized). 7 4 Moreover, a relatively high stock price tends to make
marginal investment opportunities appear more valuable than they
actually are, furthering the possibility that they will be pursued by

enhanced merger activities that produce negative long-run returns).
171. Jensen explains:
The evidence is consistent with the argument ... [that] management
makes acquisitions to con the market into believing that management
is going to create the value that the market expects, and is able to
continue to fool it for some period of time by providing the illusion of
growth. When the market finds out that the high value and growth
was an illusion the firm's value falls precipitously because all the
overvaluation will disappear as well as the value of the core business
that has been compromised by the attempts to avoid discovery.
Jensen, supra note 1, at 11-13. While Jensen concedes that "the data are also
consistent with the hypothesis that the earlier acquisitions [i.e., those occurring
prior to the large loss deal] truly created value," and acknowledges that
"[a]dditional work must be done to sort this issue out," he points to the case of
Nortel Corporation as suggesting that acquisitions by overvalued firms prior to
a large loss deal are similarly wealth-destructive in the long run, and that the
large loss deal simply tips the market off to the acquirer's overvaluation. Id. at
13.
172. "Greenfield investments" refers to investments in new projects, as
opposed to acquisitions of existing enterprises. Keith E. Maskus, The Role of
Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and
Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 109, 113 (1998). A manager
seeking to maximize the value of her firm (and thus shareholder wealth) should
pursue all those projects where the discounted present value of expected project
returns exceeds the discounted present value of the expenses associated with
pursuit of the project. Such a project would have a "positive NPV." By contrast,
managers seeking to maximize shareholder wealth should avoid any "negative
NPV" project-i.e., a project where the discounted present value of expected
returns is less than the discounted present value of the project's expenses. See
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 41, at 85-106.
173. See infra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
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Once managers begin a "growth strategy" of
management. 175
acquisitions and internal investments, they find that such a strategy
is difficult to alter; they therefore tend to sacrifice firm value by
Finally, because
pursuing the growth strategy for too long.11
managers of overvalued firms live in constant fear of discovery by
the securities markets, 77 they will forego positive NPV projects that
may temporarily reduce earnings per share. 178 Consider how these
forces work together to reduce firm value.
When equity is
(a). More Money to Invest.
overvalued, firm managers effectively have more capital to invest.
Most obviously, they may pay for expenses using their firm's
inflated stock as currency. In addition, they can raise more actual
cash by issuing new equity at prices reflecting their firm's
overvaluation. Empirical data on the issuance of equity indicate
that managers do, in fact, take advantage of periods of
overvaluation by issuing equity. 179 Moreover, managers admit to
such behavior in anonymous surveys. Professors John R. Graham
and Campbell R. Harvey, for example, found that two-thirds of
CFOs agree that "[t]he amount by which our stock is undervalued or
overvalued by the market" is an "important or very important"
consideration in deciding to issue equity. 80 Nearly as many (62.6%)
175. See infra notes 189-97 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
177. See Jensen, supra note 1, at 7-8, 10 & n.10.
178. Id. at 10.
179. See Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Market Timing and Capital
Structure, 57 J. FIN. 1, 1 (2002) ("[Alnalyses of actual financing decisions show
that firms tend to issue equity instead of debt when market value is high,
relative to book value and past market values, and tend to repurchase equity

when market value is low."). Baker and Wurgler note that numerous studies
have observed a coincidence of seasoned equity issues and high stock prices. Id.
at 1 n.1 (citing Robert A. Taggart, Jr., A Model of Corporate Financing
Decisions, 32 J. FIN. 1467, 1484 (1977); Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Jr.,
Equity Issues and Offering Dilution, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 61, 85-86 (1986); Armen
Hovakimian et al., The Debt-Equity Choice, 36 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
1, 22 (2001); Robert A. Korajczyk et al., The Effects of Information Releases on
the Pricing and Timing of Equity Issues, 4 REV. FIN. STuD. 685, 707 (1991);
Kooyul Jung et al., Timing, Investment Opportunities, ManagerialDiscretion,
and the Security Issue Decision, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 159, 182-83 (1996); Paul
Marsh, The Choice Between Equity and Debt: An Empirical Study, 37 J. FIN.
121, 142 (1982)). Similarly, they note, studies observe a coincidence of high
valuations and initial public offerings. Id. (citing Tim Loughran et al., Initial
Public Offerings: International Insights, 2 PACIFIC-BASIN FIN. J. 165 (1994);
Marco Pagano et al., Why Do Companies Go Public?An Empirical Analysis, 53
J. FIN. 27, 60 (1998)).
180. John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Theory and Practice of
Corporate Finance: Evidence from the Field, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 216 tbl.8

(2001).
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agreed that "[i]f our stock price has recently risen, the price at which
we can sell is 'high." 1 CFOs further reported that equity market
prices were the second most important of thirteen factors normally
considered in determining whether to issue common stock, 182 and
was the second most important of eight factors normally considered
in determining whether to issue convertible debt. 8 3
Equity
overvaluation is therefore likely to increase the resources with
which managers may pursue firm expansion.
(b). Incentives to Over-Invest. This easy access to
investment resources causes a version of what Jensen has termed
the "agency costs of free cash flow, " 14 for managers with the

resources to do so are likely to pursue firm expansion beyond the
point that is optimal for stockholders.
Whereas the rational
stockholder desires the firm to expand to the point at which its
marginal cost of expansion equals the marginal value added to the
firm because of such expansion, 8 5 managers will tend to seek
expansion to the point at which their private marginal benefits
occasioned by the expansion equal their marginal cost of seeking
that level of expansion (including, of course, the cost of any
"punishment" they expect to receive because they have pursued
expansion excessively). The problem arises because managers'
personal marginal costs and benefits from expansion are not strictly
proportionate to the total costs and benefits created by the
expansion. Specifically, managers receive a disproportionately large

181. Id.
182. CFOs ranked market price a more important factor in determining
whether to issue common stock than "[piroviding shares to employee
bonus/stock option plans"; "[m]aintaining a target debt-to-equity ratio";
"[dliluting the holdings of certain stockholders"; "[s]tock is our 'least risky'
source of funds"; "[w]hether our recent profits have been sufficient to fund our
activities"; "[ulsing a similar amount of equity as is used by other firms in our
industry"; "[ilssuing stock gives investors a better impression of our firm's
prospects than issuing debt"; "[ilnability to obtain funds using debt,
convertibles, or other sources"; "[clommon stock is our cheapest source of funds";
and "[t]he capital gains tax rates faced by our investors (relative to tax rates on
dividends)." Id. The only commonly considered factor deemed more important
than a high market price was concern about earnings per share dilution. Id.
183. Id. at 221 tbl.10.
184. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, CorporateFinance,
and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 323, 324 (1986).
185. See Henry G. Grabowski & Dennis C. Mueller, Managerial and
Stockholder Welfare Models of Firm Expenditures, 54 REV. ECON. & STAT. 9, 12
(1972). Because marginal costs of expansion tend to rise as expansion
continues, and marginal benefits tend to fall, expansion beyond the point at
which marginal costs equal marginal benefits reduces firm value. See Jensen,
supra note 184, at 323-24.
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share of the benefits of firm expansion. 186 All else being equal,
managers of bigger firms are better off than managers of smaller
firms-for example, their job prestige grows, they have more
resources under their control, and their compensation often
increases (as managerial compensation is frequently related to sales
volume). 187 In addition, managers often have an interest in firm
expansion as a means of providing new employment positions, for
firms often reward middle managers with promotion rather than
year-to-year bonuses.188 Thus, rational, self-interested managers
will pursue a level of investment that is excessive in that it fails to
maximize firm value.
(c). Skewed Perceptionsof Likely Project Success. In
addition to the "supply side" effect whereby managers engage in a
greater number of negative NPV projects because they have access
to the funds with which to do so, overvaluation may have a "demand
side" effect: it may make proposed projects look more profitable and
may therefore cause managers to believe that negative NPV projects
are actually positive NPV projects. Professors Christopher Polk and
Paola Sapienza have recently provided empirical evidence consistent
with this observation. 8 9
The research by Polk and Sapienza builds on a prior study by
Professor Jeremy C. Stein, who showed that stock price valuations
affect firm investment through what one might term an "equityissuance" channel.' 90 Stein demonstrated that equity-dependent
firms (i.e., those lacking ample access to cash and/or debt) would
base investment decisions on their stock price, foregoing positive
NPV investments when the price was low and the amount of capital
that could be raised in a stock issuance was relatively small.'91 The
upshot of Stein's findings was that higher stock prices would "enable
good (i.e., positive net present value) projects that otherwise would
not occur."192 Polk and Sapienza asked a follow-up question: could
stock price misvaluation affect firm investment decisions through a
"catering channel" as well as an "equity-issuance" channel, so that
higher stock prices increase the level of investment by firms that are
186. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 132, at 312-13.
187. See Jensen, supra note 184, at 323 (citing Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate
Performance and ManagerialRemuneration:An Empirical Analysis, 7 J. ACT.
& ECON. 11 (April 1985)).
188. Id. at 323.
189. See Christopher Polk & Paola Sapienza, The Real Effects of Investor
Sentiment 32 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10563, 2004),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10563.pdf.
190. See Jeremy C. Stein, Rational Capital Budgeting in an Irrational
World, 69 J. Bus. 429, 443-44 (1996).
191. Id. at 445.
192. Polk & Sapienza, supra note 189, at 2.
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not equity-dependent? 193 They theorized that managers expand firm
investment when stock prices are high because they evaluate
proposed projects according to current stock price levels. Managers
may, for example, posit multiples by which proposed projects will
increase stock prices, thereby causing proposed projects to appear
more desirable the higher current stock price is. 9 If that is the
case, then one would expect to find both that investment levels
increased as stock prices rose and that increased investment was
associated with lower returns (indicating that the increased
investment was not merely the result of equity-dependent firms'
enhanced ability to pursue positive NPV projects).
Polk and Sapienza found both correlations.
Adjusting for
investment opportunities, they found that firms with overpriced
stock tended to engage in more investment. ' 95 In addition, they
found that firms that engaged in higher levels of investment
experienced relatively lower stock returns.196 These findings suggest
that higher equity prices do not simply enable firms to pursue a
greater number of positive NPV investments; instead, they cause
investment to expand to include negative NPV projects.
That
finding is consistent with the authors' theory that managers
evaluate project proposals according to current stock price levels. 97
T

193. Id.
194. Id. Polk and Sapienza explain:
If new investment projects are evaluated at the current stock market
price, for example as in the practice of using "multiples" to evaluate
new projects, and if there is enough asymmetry of information
regarding project quality, a rational manager may find it optimal to
invest in projects with negative NPV even when the project is not
financed with equity issues. Firms with ample cash or debt capacity
may have an incentive to waste resources when their stock price is
overpriced and to forgo positive investment opportunities when their
stock price is undervalued. Thus mispricing may affect investment
without working through an equity channel ....

Id.
195. Id. at 5. Polk and Sapienza utilized three well-established proxies for
overvaluation: high discretionary accruals, high net equity issuances, and price
momentum. Id. at 4-5 (discussing why these metrics are fair proxies for
overvaluation). Adjusting for investment opportunities, the authors found "a
positive relation between all of these three mispricing proxies and firm
investment." Id. at 5.
196. Id. at 6 ("We find that firms with high (low) investment have low (high)
stock returns, after controlling for investment opportunities and other
characteristics linked to return predictability.").
197. Id. at 2-3. Of course, it is also consistent with managers acting in a
consciously opportunistic fashion and pursuing projects they believe to have a
negative NPV simply because such projects promise them personal benefits.
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 132, at 312-13.
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If, indeed, they do so, then overvaluation will lead to further
investor loss by causing managers to overestimate the value of
proposed projects.
(d). The "Stickiness" of a Growth Strategy.
Acquisitions and internal investments represent "growth" strategies
for firms. Recent research suggests that once corporate managers
set a firm on this sort of growth course, that course can be difficult
to reverse, and value-destruction may result. 198 Professors Philippe
Aghion and Jeremy C. Stein observe that constraints on firms'
resources, particularly on managers' time, force firms to decide
between increasing sales growth (i.e., pursuing a growth strategy)
and improving profit margins (by, for example, lowering per unit
costs).' 99 Investors, then, evaluate the firm's performance and
prospects according to whether its managers have chosen a growth
or margins strategy, altering their performance measures depending
on the strategy management has selected.2 ° In particular, if the
market believes a firm is pursuing a growth strategy, its valuation
will tend to put more weight on realized growth. That will, in turn,
encourage managers to stick with the growth strategy so as to avoid
disappointing the market. Only when the growth strategy becomes
severely inefficient will managers shift to a cost-cutting strategy.20 '
Thus, decisions to pursue growth strategies are "sticky." Managers
who adopt such strategies in an attempt to bolster stock price or
keep an inflated stock price from declining will tend to pursue such
strategies too long-i.e., to the point at which they are sacrificing
firm value.
(e). Avoidance of Positive NPV Projects. In addition
to causing active value destruction through unwise acquisitions and
greenfield investments, overvaluation may cause passive value
198. Philippe Aghion & Jeremy C. Stein, Growth vs. Margins: Destabilizing
Consequences of Giving the Stock Market What It Wants 2-3 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10999, 2004), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10999.pdf.
199. Id. at 1 ("[D]oing more on one dimension [i.e., either growth or margins]
necessarily implies doing less on the other."). Other scholars have similarly
recognized that managers face this sort of "multi-tasking" problem. See, e.g.,
Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses:
Incentive Contracts,Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24,
25-26 (1991) (noting the difficulty of managing employees with multidimensional tasks).
200. Aghion & Stein, supra note 198, at 1 (citing Harrison G. Hong &
Jeremy C. Stein, Simple Forecasts and Paradigm Shifts, Harv. Inst. Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 2007, 2003, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=412801 (demonstrating how this sort of emphasis
shift occurred in analysts' reports on Amazon.com)).
201. Id. at 2-3.
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destruction by encouraging managers to forego positive NPV
projects. Because the dominant strategy of managers of overvalued
firms is, in the words of Jensen, to "postpone the day of reckoning
,,202
until [they] are gone or [they] figure out how to resolve the issue,
they will look for opportunities to conceal their firm's overvaluation
from the market. One way to do so is to delay investment
expenditures in order to meet quarterly earnings expectations and
avoid the value reassessment that accompanies missing such an
expectation. 203 Accordingly, many managers will delay positive NPV
investments-even where such a delay entails a sacrifice in firm
value-in an attempt to dupe the market.
Recent research suggests that this sort of value-sacrificing
behavior is widespread. In their 2004 survey of 401 corporate CFOs,
Professors John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey, and Shivaram
Rajgopal posed the following question: "Near the end of the quarter,
it looks like your company might come in below the desired earnings
target. Within what is permitted by GAAP, which of the following
choices

might

your

company

make? 2 0 4

Eighty

percent

of

respondents stated that their companies would be willing to delay
discretionary expenditures
on research
and development,
advertising, and maintenance, and over fifty-five percent stated that
their company would "delay starting a new project even if this
entails a small sacrifice in value."2 5 Overvaluation thus tends to
cause passive value destruction as managers attempt to buy time by
delaying positive NPV investments.
(iii). Eventual Fraud. Once managers of overvalued
firms have exhausted their opportunities to boost or maintain
apparent firm value through acquisitions and greenfield
investments, they face a temptation to pursue more direct means of
duping the market. They may begin with "earnings management,"
the well-accepted practice of smoothing earnings by strategically
timing the recognition of revenues and expenses in order to meet
202. Jensen, supra note 1, at 10; see also supra notes 155-59 and
accompanying text (discussing objectives of managers of overvalued firms).
203. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text (discussing stock price
effects of earnings surprises).
204. John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey & Shivaram Rajgopal, The
Economic Implications of CorporateFinancialReporting tbl.6 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
10550,
2005),
available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=491627.
205. Id. Around forty percent of respondents stated that they would "book
revenues now rather than next quarter (if justified in either quarter)." Id. This
result is consistent with the view that earnings management is being used to
dupe the market to prevent discovery of overvaluation. See infra notes 206-08
and accompanying text.
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206

market projections.
Indeed, around forty percent of the CFOs
surveyed by Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal reported that they
would "book revenues now rather than next quarter" if their
company were in danger of missing an earnings target. 7° Some
scholars have argued that earnings management is itself
fraudulent. 20 8 Even if it is not, though, it tends to evolve rapidly into
outright fraud, for managers who recognize revenues early and push
recognition of expenses into the future will face more difficult
accounting challenges in subsequent quarters and will eventually
have no choice but to lie or have their company be discovered as
overvalued.2 °9
It should be obvious that accounting manipulation will create
significant agency costs for a firm. In the likely event that a firm's
accounting manipulations are revealed, the firm's reputation for
honesty and candor will be damaged. Such a reputation is, of
course, essential to a successful firm: when a company's managers
are less than forthright, customers will be less willing to do business
with the firm; compliance costs will rise as regulators monitor the
firm more closely; potential business partners will be less willing to
embark on joint ventures; lenders will be less likely to extend credit
on favorable terms; and investors will invest their money elsewhere
(or demand a higher return on investment).
Accounting
manipulations thus make it hard for a company to flourish and, in
extreme cases, may kill the company altogether. 2 0 Thus, the agency
206. See Jensen, supra note 1, at 7-8 (describing earnings management and
noting that it "has been considered an integral part of every top manager's job
for at least the last two decades").
207. Graham et al., supra note 204, at tbl.6.
208. For example, Jensen argues:
[W]hen managers smooth earnings to meet market projections, they
are not creating value for the firm; they are both lying and making
poor decisions

that destroy value.

.

.

. [W]hen

numbers

are

manipulated to tell the markets what they want to hear (or what
managers want them to hear) rather than the true status of the
firm-it is lying, and when real operating decisions that would
maximize value are compromised to meet market expectations real
long-term value is being destroyed.
Jensen, supra note 1, at 8 (footnote omitted).
209. Id. ("Revenues borrowed from the future and today's expenses pushed
to tomorrow require even more manipulation in the future to forestall the day of
reckoning.").
210. Enron represents perhaps the most striking recent example of this
process. See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 386-87, 394, 398, 401-03
(describing the lack of faith and trust that banks, analysts, trading partners,
and the public felt toward Enron immediately preceding its collapse); MIMI
SWARTZ &

SHERRON

COLLAPSE OF ENRON

WATKINS,

POWER FAILURE:

THE INSIDE

STORY OF THE

(2003). Valued at its peak at around $70 billion, Enron
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costs created by accounting manipulation, which overvalued equity
encourages as a means of buying time, are potentially huge.
c. Greater Reliance Costs. In addition to imposing greater
agency costs than undervaluation, equity overvaluation is likely to
cause investors to suffer greater "reliance" losses. To see this point,
consider two hypothetical cases of misrepresentation. In one case, a
credible source informs the victim (Victim A) that her savings are
worth twenty-five percent less than they are actually worth. In the
second, the victim (Victim B) is told that her savings are worth
twenty-five percent more than they actually are. In both cases, the
truth is revealed one year after the misrepresentation is made. Who
is likely to suffer greater damages-Victim A or Victim B?
To answer this question, consider the two victims' likely courses
of action. Victim A, misinformed that her savings are undervalued,
will likely save more (i.e., divert income from current consumption
to savings), and/or move her invested funds, which she believes are
not adequately appreciating, into what she deems to be the next best
investments. 211 Her damage occasioned by the misrepresentation
was actually worth around $30 billion-still a significant amount by anyone's
standards. Jensen, supra note 1, at 10-11. Through accounting manipulations
aimed at disguising this degree of overvaluation, however, Enron's managers
impaired the company's reputation and, in the process, destroyed its value. Id.
at 11. As Jensen explains:
[S] enior managers' efforts to defend the $40 billion of excess valuation
(which was a mistake that was going to go away anyway) effectively
destroyed the $30 billion core value ....
[Enron's managers] destroyed
[the company] by trying to fool the markets through accounting
manipulations, hiding debt through off-balance sheet partnerships,
and over hyped new ventures such as their broadband futures effort.
In doing this, Enron's managers gambled with their critical assetEnron's reputation for integrity.
Id.
211. Above minimal income levels, individuals tend not to spend their entire
incomes on immediate consumption; instead, they set a portion aside in the
form of savings to pay for future consumption. Stout, supra note 47, at 682. In
allocating their income, they attempt to achieve an optimal balance between
present and future consumption. Their decisions regarding how much to save
and where to invest are influenced by their current investment portfolio.
Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 767 (1985)
("[C]apital markets facilitate individual planning of consumption over time in
light of anticipated resources ....
[They also] guide investment and saving
decisions through prices."). If an investor believes his portfolio is worth less
than it is, he'll tend to divert too much money toward savings and away from
current consumption. He may also divert money from the undervalued security
into other investments. If the investor believes his portfolio is worth more than
it is, he will tend to divert money away from savings and toward current

HeinOnline -- 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1093 2006

1094

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

will thus consist of (1) her net utility loss from foregoing current
consumption to save instead, plus (2) the difference between her
"second best" investment returns and the returns she would have
received had she not moved her invested funds. Victim B, led to
believe that she's richer than she really is, will likely save less and
consume more. If her impressive returns lead her to save more, she
will likely invest in the same investments currently in her
purportedly (but not actually) high-performing portfolio. Indeed,
this pattern of increased consumption and re-investment in
apparently appreciating enterprises occurred all too often during the
technology bubble of the late 1990s.
While it is impossible to say, without more facts, whether
Victim A or Victim B is hurt to a greater degree, the stronger
intuition seems to be that Victim B (the one misinformed that her
savings were worth more than they are) would probably suffer
greater harm in the long run. Individuals normally allocate their
resources according to expected marginal utility.
Their first
resources are devoted to basic necessities (e.g., food and shelter),
then they typically save for the future, and whatever is left over is
spent on luxuries (e.g., consumption of non-necessities, charitable
contributions, etc.). 212 As they move from necessities to luxuries,
their expenditures tend to produce less incremental utility. A
person who is misinformed that she's wealthier than she really is
will tend to shift from investment spending to luxury spending too
quickly, thereby allocating her resources in a manner that fails to
maximize her expected utility. It thus appears that the reliance
losses occasioned by equity overvaluation (a misrepresentation that
one is richer than one really is) are greater than those occasioned by
equity undervaluation. Investors may therefore place a premium on
corporate policies that reduce the risk of overvaluation.
d.
Greater Impairment of Stock Price as a Managerial
Monitoring Tool. Corporate managers who fail to increase firm
value frequently are, and should be, replaced. The decision to
replace incumbent managers is generally initiated by the board of
directors or by large shareholders (e.g., institutional investors).
Because information regarding the performance of managers is
costly to obtain (particularly in large enterprises in which the
consumption. See id. at 768-69 (arguing that individuals save too little when
their securities are undervalued, and save too much when their securities are
overvalued). But see Stout, supra note 47, at 682-84 (arguing that efficient
securities prices are not that important to investors in deciding how to allocate
their money).
212. Cf Stout, supra note 47, at 682 (discussing how individuals tend to
allocate financial resources as their income grows).
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relevant information is possessed by numerous employees scattered
throughout the firm),213 directors and large shareholders rationally
seek out proxies for managerial performance. Stock price reflects
the discounted present value of the firm's future cash flows 214 and is
therefore a good, though admittedly imperfect, proxy.2 15
Stock mispricing obviously thwarts the effectiveness of this
monitoring tool. 216
If stock is undervalued, directors and
institutional shareholders will be too quick to replace incumbent
management, and if stock is overvalued, directors and large
shareholders may fail to seek replacement when they ought to do so.
Both forms of mispricing therefore increase the difficulty of
monitoring managers.
But the degree to which mispricing thwarts effective
managerial monitoring is likely to be greater when stocks are
mispriced upward than when the mispricing is in a downward
direction. If the directors of a corporation decide to replace an
incumbent manager upon observing a stock price that appears to be
too low, the manager can plead her case to the board, explaining
why the stock price is temporarily depressed and will eventually
rebound. If, for example, management is concealing price-increasing
information for strategic purposes (as in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur217 ), the manager will generally explain that fact to the
board or institutional investors. Thus, those parties are likely to
learn of mispricing in a downward direction before they make a poor
staffing decision. On the other hand, if the stock is overvalued

213. See Bainbridge, supra note 83, at 1013-14 (arguing that longer
information paths "equate to less accurate information and poorer decisions.");
Manne, supra note 25, at 14-15 (suggesting that there is usually a delay in time
for information to reach a top manager).
214. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 41, at 59-62.
215. A falling stock price does not, of course, necessarily signal poor
management. Nor does a rising stock price signal good management. Even a
rising stock price may signal poor management if the price is rising more slowly
than the stock price of similarly situated benchmark firms, and a falling stock
price may signal good management if the rate of decrease is slower than that of
benchmark firms.
216. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 867 ("[A]ccurately priced
securities will enable firms to observe more accurately when corporate
managers are successful. Thus, markets for managerial services and for
corporate control will function more effectively.").
217. 401 F.2d 833 (2nd Cir. 1968) (discussed infra at notes 219-22, 307-10
and accompanying text). In Texas Gulf Sulphur, a mining company that had
discovered a valuable ore deposit attempted to keep its stock price depressed
(i.e., at a level not reflecting the ore discovery) so that it could buy up
surrounding land and mineral rights without tipping off current owners of those
lands and rights. Id. at 844.
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because of undisclosed information, there will likely be no
opportunity for the directors or institutional investors to learn of
this fact (management is unlikely to volunteer the information), and
they may thus fail to replace managers who really ought to be
replaced. In other words, identification of mispricing within the
boardroom is much less likely to occur if the price is too high than if
it is too low, and overvaluation is therefore more likely than
undervaluation to reduce the efficacy of stock price as a low-cost tool
for monitoring managers.
B.

Lower Costs From Price-DecreasingInsider Trading

Part II.A demonstrated that price-decreasing insider trading
provides greater benefits to investors than does insider trading that
increases stock prices. Part II.B examines the cost side of the
balance, concluding that the investor costs occasioned by pricedecreasing insider trading are likely to be lower than those caused
by price-increasing insider trading.
1.

Less Likely to Thwart CorporateOpportunities

Of the two species of insider trading, price-decreasing insider
trading is less likely to cause what is perhaps the most important
type of corporate harm occasioned by insider trading: the thwarting
of value-enhancing corporate transactions that could otherwise be
accomplished. 2" To see this point, consider why price-increasing
insider trading might prevent such transactions from occurring and
why price-decreasing insider trading generally could not do so.
Price-increasing insider trading may injure a corporation
seeking to take advantage of nonpublic information regarding an
asset's hidden value. Suppose, for example, that managers are
aware that some asset the corporation seeks to acquire is
undervalued and, if purchased by the corporation, would enhance
corporate value.219 The law generally permits an asset buyer who
has discovered information regarding an asset's hidden value to
refrain from disclosing that information, 20 and the corporation will
218. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 600-02 (discussing how insider trading
could thwart value-creating corporate transactions).
219. The classic case involving this sort of fact pattern is Texas Gulf
Sulphur, in which geologists from a mining company had discovered a valuable
ore deposit. 401 F.2d at 843. Managers knew that the value of the company
would be substantially enhanced if it could acquire land and mineral rights
from neighbors at a favorable price. Id. at 844.
220. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 cmt. d (1981) ("A buyer
of property . . . is not ordinarily expected to disclose circumstances that make
the property more valuable than the seller supposes."). Professor Anthony T.
Kronman explains why this is so:
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thus want to keep such information a secret in order to prevent the
asset's price from rising.22 1 If managers, who are aware of the
corporation's forthcoming asset purchase, attempt to profit
personally by purchasing their corporation's own stock, their trading
may cause an increase in the corporation's stock price.222 That price
activity may then cause the current owner of the asset not to sell or
to demand a higher price. Price-increasing insider trading, then,
2 23
would squander an otherwise available corporate opportunity.
While such insider trading would appear to be a violation of the
insiders' fiduciary duties, regardless of the law on insider trading,224
the insider trading prohibition does act as a prophylactic bar to this
sort of corporate harm.
With respect to price-decreasing insider trading, by contrast, it

By and large, the cases requiring disclosure involve information which
is likely to have been casually acquired ....
The cases permitting
nondisclosure, on the other hand, involve information which, on the
whole, is likely to have been deliberately produced. Taken as a group,
the disclosure cases give at least the appearance of promoting
allocative efficiency by limiting the assignment of property rights to
those types of information which are likely to be the fruit of a
deliberate investment (either in the development of expertise or in
actual searching).
Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of
Contracts,7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 18 (1978). Because the information regarding the
hidden value of an asset the corporation would like to acquire is likely to have
been "deliberately produced," the corporation will generally have the right to
refrain from disclosing such information prior to purchase.
221. In Texas Gulf Sulphur, for example, the company president specifically
ordered insiders to keep the discovery at issue a secret so as not to tip off
neighboring landowners. 401 F.2d at 843.
222. Once again, in Texas Gulf Sulphur the stock price rose substantially
following unauthorized insider trading (from 20%18 when chemical assay results
proved the discovery to around 37 when the discovery was publicly announced).
Id. at 847.
223. Price-increasing insider trading could also thwart value-creating
acquisitions of other businesses. As Bainbridge explains:
If managers charged with overseeing an acquisition buy shares in the
target, and their trading has a significant upward effect on the price
of the target's stock, the takeover will be more expensive.
If
significant price and volume changes are caused by their trading, that
also might tip off others to the secret, interfering with the bidder's
plans, as by alerting the target to the need for defensive measures.
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 600.
224. See Todd A. Bauman, Comment, Insider Trading at Common Law, 51
U. CHI. L. REV. 838, 863 n.114 (1984) ("[I]f a manager actually harms his
corporation through a particular insider-trading transaction, he should be liable
to his firm for a breach of his duty of care, even if it is determined that insider
trading in general does not violate a manager's duty of loyalty.").
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is difficult to see how such trading could thwart a value-creating
corporate transaction that could otherwise be legally accomplished.
The relevant situation would be one in which the corporation had an
interest in keeping its stock's price inflated above its true value in
order to accomplish some transaction. For example, the corporation
might desire to use its overvalued stock as consideration for a
purchase, to issue new equity at an inflated price, or to secure credit
on favorable terms. But it probably could not do so. If insiders were
aware of information indicating that the stock was overvalued but
refrained from disclosing that information, any stock pricedependent transaction entered into during the period of inflation
would likely be voidable by the corporation's counter-party.2 2 Thus,
corporate transactions that would be thwarted by price-decreasing
insider trading probably could not be legally accomplished in any
event.
There is, in short, an asymmetry in the law regarding precontract disclosures, and that asymmetry causes price-increasing
insider trading to be more value-destructive than price-decreasing
insider trading. Because a corporation generally need not disclose
information about hidden value before transacting on the basis of
that information,
it may legitimately keep such information a
.226
secret. Price-increasing insider trading may prevent it from doing
so, and may thereby thwart value-creating transactions.
Information suggesting that the corporation is overvalued, however,
must generally be disclosed. 227 Accordingly, price-decreasing insider
trading would not reveal any corporate secrets that would not
otherwise have to be revealed. It is therefore less likely to squander
legitimate corporate opportunities.

225. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981) (permitting
rescission of contract by party who is victim of fraudulent or material
misrepresentation); id. § 161(b) (stating circumstances under which failure to
disclose negative information may give rise to right to void a contract).
226. See id. § 161(b) cmt. d (observing that while "[a) buyer of property... is
not ordinarily expected to disclose circumstances that make the property more
valuable than the seller supposes," the seller is "ordinarily expected to disclose
a known latent defect of quality or title that is of such a character as would
probably prevent the buyer from buying at the contract price"); Kronman, supra
note 220, at 18 (arguing that deliberately produced information regarding
hidden value need not be disclosed prior to contracting).
227. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(b) (1981) (stating that
nondisclosure of a fact is fraudulent and renders a contract voidable where the
non-disclosing party "knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake
of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is making the
contract and if nondisclosure of the fact amounts to a failure to act in good faith
and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing").
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Less Likely to Infringe CorporateProperty Rights

Some scholars, who are skeptical of most claims that insider
trading harms investors and society in general, defend the insider
trading prohibition (some version of it, at least) on grounds that it
protects corporations' property rights to information regarding their
business and prospects.2 8 Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge, for
example, discounts most of the standard arguments that insider
trading is harmful,2 29 but nonetheless concludes that the insider
trading prohibition is justifiable "as a means of protecting property
rights in information. 2 30
Bainbridge and other "propertarians"
explain that assigning the corporation a property right in
information regarding firm prospects, and protecting that right by
banning trading by insiders on the basis of that information,
protects the firm's economic incentive to produce socially valuable
information. 23' Bainbridge admits that property protection is not as
crucial here as it is with traditionally recognized forms of
intellectual property such as patents, for firm managers may be
motivated to produce socially valuable information regarding the
corporation's prospects even if that information does not receive
property protection. 232
Nonetheless, he argues, "[t]here is no

228. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 598-607; Easterbrook, supra note
18, at 313; Macey, supra note 24, at 32.
229. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 592-98 (discounting pro-regulation
arguments other than those related to protection of firm's property rights).
230. Id. at 791.
231. See id. at 599 ("The rationale for prohibiting insider trading is the same
as that for prohibiting patent infringement or theft of trade secrets: protecting
the economic incentive to produce socially valuable information."); Easterbrook,
supra note 18, at 313 (explaining how property protection may be necessary to
preserve incentives to create information); Macey, supra note 24, at 30 ("Legal
rules should be developed that insure the optimal production of information.
Analysis of how optimal production might be achieved is best seen by viewing
inside information as a form of property interest."); see also United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., dissenting), in which Judge
Winter rationalized the federal insider trading ban as follows:
Information is perhaps the most precious commodity in commercial
markets. It is expensive to produce, and, because it involves facts and
ideas that can be easily photocopied or carried in one's head, there is a
ubiquitous risk that those who pay to produce information will see
others reap the profit from it. Where the profit from an activity is
likely to be diverted, investment in that activity will decline. If the
law fails to protect property rights in commercial information,
therefore, less will be invested in generating such information.
Id. at 576-77 (Winter, J., dissenting).
232. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 604 ("From the corporation's perspective
...
legalizing insider trading would have a relatively small effect on the firm's
incentive to develop new information."); see Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness,
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avoiding the necessity of assigning a property interest in the
information to either the corporation or the insider,"233 and, because
assignment of the right to the corporation is likely to have some
positive incentive effect at the margin,
the right ought to be
assigned to the corporation." 5 The argument for assigning the right
to insiders, Bainbridge argues, is "considerably weaker."236 He says
that "[tihe only plausible reason for doing so is the argument that
legalized insider trading would be an appropriate compensation
scheme."2 37 In sum, the propertarians reason that because the
incentive benefits of assigning the right to the corporation would
likely exceed any benefits from providing insiders with
compensation in the form of legal insider trading, the right to inside
information ought to be given to the corporation.
This analysis assumes, though, that positive inside information
(i.e., "good news" suggesting that the corporation is undervalued)
and negative inside information (i.e., "bad news" suggesting that the
corporation is overvalued) should be treated the same.238
In
actuality, there are good reasons to afford different treatment to the
two types of information. To see this point, consider (1) why the law
creates rights to information, and (2) how it ought to go about
assigning those rights.
The creation of a right to information should be based upon the
extent to which creation of the right would enhance incentives to
produce the information at issue; the more likely it is that property
protection would enhance those incentives, the more appropriate it

Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the
Information Age, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 443, 488-90 (2001) (arguing that firm
managers would create the socially valuable information purportedly protected
by the insider trading ban even if the corporation did not "own" the "right" to
that information).
233. BAINBRIDGE, supranote 4, at 604.
234. Id. ("As with other property rights, the law ... should simply assume
(although the assumption will sometimes be wrong) that assigning the property
right to agent-produced information to the firm maximizes the social incentives
for the production of valuable new information.").
235. Id. ("In some cases, however, insider trading will harm the
corporation's interests and thus adversely affect its incentives in this regard
[i.e., to develop new, socially beneficial information]. This argues for assigning
the property right to the corporation, rather than the insider.").
236. Id.
237. Id.; see supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (discussing argument
that insider trading may provide efficient compensation mechanism).
238. It also appears to assume that the right should not be transferable from
the corporation to insiders, a point that many propertarians fiercely contest.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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is for the law to recognize such a right.239 This observation suggests

that property status is more appropriately afforded to positive inside
information than to negative inside information. "Good news" is, to
a large degree, deliberately created by the corporation's agents as
they perpetually work to cut costs, increase revenues, and expand
markets. "Bad news," on the other hand, tends simply to happen.
Because there generally is less deliberate effort involved in creating
negative inside information, there is less need for property
protection at all. While it may be desirable to create incentives to
discover negative inside information (as when an enterprising
manager investigates consumer demand for his firm's new or
proposed product and discovers that it is softer than expected, or
when a mid-level accountant scrutinizes records to discover that her
peers are fudging the numbers to make the firm appear more
profitable than it really is), there is no need to provide incentives to
With respect to positive inside
create the underlying facts.
information, on the other hand, the law should encourage both the
discovery and the creation of the underlying facts. 240 Thus, the case

for affording property status to inside information is stronger for
positive inside information than for negative inside information,
though it still might be desirable to recognize property rights to
negative inside information so as to encourage its discovery.
The more important consideration, though, is the question of
assignment. Assuming there are good reasons for affording property
status to both positive and negative inside information, should the
rights to both sorts of information be assigned to the same party?
Probably not. Investors would be best off if the right to information
regarding corporate affairs were assigned to the corporate
constituent most likely to use it to maximize firm value. If giving
the right to the information to the corporation and denying insiders
a right to use it would maximize firm value, then the corporation
ought to get the right; if instead firm value would be maximized by
giving the right to corporate agents, then investors would prefer
that the right be distributed accordingly. 2 4' There are good reasons
239. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 599; Easterbrook, supra note 18, at
313-14.
240. Note, though, that the case for property rights in positive inside
information still is not as strong as the case for traditional forms of intellectual
property, for managers are generally motivated to create good news even
without property protection. See Krawiec, supra note 232, at 489 ("Issuers
create valuable information about themselves to operate a successful business
enterprise, not to generate trading profits.").
241. One can imagine a hypothetical bargain among investors and managers
over how the rights to positive and negative inside information should be
allocated. The party that could create the most value from the information
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to believe that the corporation is most likely to maximize the value
of positive inside information, but that corporate agents acting in
their individual capacities are more likely to maximize the value of
negative inside information.
First, consider positive inside information. As noted, it is often
the case that a value-enhancing corporate opportunity will be
available only if the firm is able to enter into contracts that would be
thwarted (or would be possible only on less favorable terms) by
insider trades.24 2
If the good news regarding the corporate
opportunity were exploitable by insiders, the opportunity and the
corporate value created thereby would not be available to the firm.
Accordingly, value would be maximized by giving the firm the right
to positive inside information.
With regard to negative inside information, by contrast,
employees are more likely to be the value-maximizers. If the
corporation "owns" bad news, corporate managers will likely
suppress the news to the extent they are permitted to do so under
the securities laws,243 leading to a period of overvaluation and the
costs that accompany such mispricing.2 "
This period of
overvaluation, unlike the period of undervaluation that will occur if
managers suppress good news in order to pursue a corporate
opportunity that might otherwise be thwarted,245 will not result in
the creation of any lasting value for the corporation. Thus, if the
would, assuming it could capture that value for itself because the information's
benefits accrued to it naturally or could be "sold" to those it benefited, be willing
to "pay" the most for the information. (The corporation would "pay" by
providing a higher wage to employees in exchange for their forbearance from
using the information; the employees would "pay" by reducing their wage
demands.) In any event, the party valuing the information the most would
likely end up with it. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). The law, then, ought to initially assign the right to the
party most likely to create the most value from the information-the ultimate
"buyer" in the hypothetical bargain.
242. Insider trades would signal the firm's contracting partner to refrain
from executing the deal or to demand more favorable terms. See supra notes
219-24 and accompanying text.
243. Bad news need not be disclosed absent some affirmative disclosure
requirement, such as one of the requirements imposed by the laws mandating
periodic disclosures. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., 269 F.3d 806, 808 (7th
Cir. 2001) ("We do not have a system of continuous disclosure. Instead firms
are entitled to keep silent (about good news as well as bad news) unless positive
law creates a duty to disclose."). This means corporate managers will often be
free to sit on bad news and allow overvaluation to persist (and increase in
magnitude).
244. See supra notes 148-205 and accompanying text (discussing agency
costs resulting from overvaluation).
245. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
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negative information is owned by the corporation, it is not likely to
be used in a way that enhances investor wealth in a non-transitory
fashion. If, instead, corporate employees own the bad news they
discover, they are likely to trade on it, pushing the corporation's
stock price toward actual value. 46 This salutary effect on price will
alleviate the investor harms associated with equity overvaluation
(e.g., agency costs) and will benefit society as a whole (not just
investors) by enhancing allocative efficiency.
In sum, the optimal allocation of property rights in inside
information regarding firm prospects-i.e., the allocation corporate
24 7
agents and investors would agree to in a hypothetical bargain would likely assign the right to positive inside information to the
corporation, while allocating the right to negative inside information
to corporate insiders. Thus, price-decreasing insider trading, unlike
price-increasing insider trading, would not infringe upon the
corporation's right to information concerning firm prospects.
3.

Less Likely to Dissuade Investors

A corporation's liberalization of insider trading might dissuade
potential stockholders from investing in that corporation. Investors
may be dissuaded by concerns about firm value (i.e., they may
perceive that a liberalized insider trading policy will result in
management decisions that lower the firm's fundamental value),24
or they may steer clear of the firm out of concern that they could end
up trading stock with an insider possessing an informational
advantage.
It is likely, though, that investors would be less
dissuaded by an asymmetric policy that liberalized price-decreasing
insider trading but generally banned the price-increasing variety
than by all-or-nothing policies that either permitted or banned all
insider trading.
To see this point, consider the decision calculus facing an
investor deciding among investments in three firms that are
identical except for their insider trading policies. Suppose that Firm
A bans all insider trading, Firm B permits all insider trading, and
Firm C permits price-decreasing insider trading (at least, if it is
disclosed) 2 9 while generally banning price-increasing insider
246. See infra notes 260-87 and accompanying text (explaining why agents
are likely to engage in price-decreasing insider trading if permitted to do so).
247. See supra note 241.
248. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; infra notes 289-90 and
accompanying text (discussing potential mismanagement occasioned by a
liberalized insider trading policy).
249. For reasons discussed below, a firm adopting a policy liberalizing pricedecreasing insider trading would likely require that such trading be disclosed at
the time of execution. See infra notes 260-80 and accompanying text.
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trading. With respect to Firm A (no insider trading allowed), the
investor would take comfort in the fact that she would not be
purchasing stock from an insider with superior information, but she
would worry that the stock might be currently overvalued or that it
might become substantially overvalued, leading to increased agency
costs and a potential crash.25 ° With respect to Firm B (all insider
trading allowed), the investor would not be concerned about
significant overvaluation (insider trading would prevent such
mispricing),251 but she might worry that the liberalized insider
trading policy could result in insiders' squandering corporate
opportunities, thereby reducing long-term firm value.5 2 With
respect to Firm C (only price-decreasing insider trading allowed),
the investor would take comfort in the fact that the stock is unlikely
to be overvalued,2 3 and she would not worry about insiders
squandering otherwise available corporate opportunities. 5 4 While
she would run the risk that she might be buying from an insider
possessing an informational advantage, she would not be
particularly concerned, for the extent of overvaluation likely would
not be great.255 Moreover, for reasons discussed below, any concerns
about corporate mismanagement would be allayed by a corporate
policy requiring that price-decreasing insider trading be
immediately disclosed.256 Thus, of the three possible insider trading
policies, a policy authorizing price-decreasing insider trading, but
not the price-increasing variety, seems least likely to dissuade
potential investors.

250. See supra notes 132-212 and accompanying text (discussing
overvaluation's effect on agency costs and reliance costs).
251. As explained below, disclosed price-decreasing insider trading would
prevent stock price overvaluation by "derivatively informing" the market that
those closest to the business believed it to be overvalued. See infra notes 260-80
and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text (explaining how priceincreasing insider trading may squander corporate opportunities).
253. See infra notes 260-80 and accompanying text (explaining why
disclosed price-decreasing insider trading will prevent overvaluation).
254. See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text (explaining why pricedecreasing insider trading, unlike the price-increasing variety, would not
thwart otherwise available corporate opportunities).
255. See infra notes 284-87 and accompanying text (explaining how
liberalized price-decreasing insider trading essentially creates a "bounty" for
the first insider to "report" overvaluation, thereby preventing companies from
becoming significantly overvalued).
256. See infra notes 289-96 and accompanying text (explaining how
disclosure requirement could alleviate concerns about mismanagement
occasioned by liberalized price-decreasing insider trading).
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C. Synthesis: An Asymmetric Insider Trading Policy as
MajoritarianDefault
So far, we have seen that: (1) undervaluation is more likely to
be
self-correcting
(even without insider
trading) than
overvaluation; 257 (2) in the long run, undervaluation is unlikely to
impose significant costs on investors, while overvaluation is likely to
do so;25 and (3) whereas insider trading that pushes a stock's price
upward toward actual value may cause harm to the corporation and
its investors, insider trading that pushes an inflated price
downward toward value is unlikely to do

So. 2 "

Taken together,

these observations suggest that an asymmetric insider trading
policy that permits some form of price-decreasing insider trading,
while generally banning price-increasing insider trading, is the
policy investors and managers would likely bargain for were they
able (practically and legally) to do so.
In other words, an
asymmetric insider trading policy that liberalizes only pricedecreasing insider trading likely represents the majoritarian default
policy.
But that's the easy part. As with so many policy proposals, the
devil is in the details.
Specifically, how would corporations
structure a policy liberalizing price-decreasing insider trading so as
to maximize such trading's salutary effect on stock price? Would
corporate insiders engage in price-decreasing insider trading if they
were legally permitted to do so? And would a policy liberalizing
such trading encourage mismanagement and/or hinder the flow of
negative information within the corporation?
The following
discussion outlines the sort of liberalized policy corporations would
likely adopt (Part II.C.1) and addresses potential problems such a
policy might create (Part II.C.2).
1.
The Design of the Default Policy: Disclosed PriceDecreasingInsider TradingPermitted
The fundamental objective of a policy liberalizing pricedecreasing insider trading would be to harness insider trading's
power to drive stock prices toward their fundamental value.26 °
257. See supra Part II.A.1 (explaining why managers and analysts are more
likely to correct undervaluation than overvaluation).
258. See supra Part II.A.2 (explaining why overvaluation is more likely to
cause significant investor harm than undervaluation).
259. See supra Part II.B (discussing how price-increasing insider trading is
more likely than the price-decreasing variety to squander corporate
opportunities, infringe upon corporate property rights to information, and
dissuade potential investors).
260. As discussed above, there is near consensus among economists that
insider trading pushes a stock's market price toward its fundamental value.
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Accordingly, structuring an effective policy requires consideration of
the mechanisms by which insider trading leads to more accurate
securities prices. Insider trading has its price-correcting effect
because it conveys a valuable piece of information: that those closest
to the company and most informed about its operations believe it to
be either undervalued (in the case of insider purchases) or
overvalued (in the case of insider sales).2 6'
Armed with that
information, investors who are not privy to the actual facts
motivating the insider transactions will nonetheless follow the lead
of the insiders by buying or selling the stock or adjusting their
reservation prices (the amount they would be willing to pay to
obtain the stock or would require to give it up). 262 As a result of this
process, the market price of the stock will change to reflect the
information conveyed by insider trades and, because insiders are the
individuals best-informed about the company's true prospects, will
263
become more accurate.
As Professors Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman
famously explained, there are actually two mechanisms by which
insider trading may "derivatively inform" traders of stock mispricing
(and thereby promote price-correction). 264
First, investors may

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
261. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 629-30 (explaining why
insider trading will tend to push stock prices in the right direction).
262. See Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider
Trading Through PretradingDisclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 324 (1998)
(explaining how investors follow the lead of insiders in determining how to
value a stock and where to invest their money).
263. It is important to recognize that insider trading's salutary price effect
results from the information such trading conveys, not from the fact that the
trading alters the supply of or demand for the security at issue. The supply
effect of insider trading could not be responsible for the price changes it causes
because the relevant supply at issue is not the particular security being traded,
but is instead the risk-reward combination offered by that security and a host of
others, and is thus so vast that any increased or reduced demand by insiders
would be too small to affect price. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at
630 (noting that because "the relevant supply for purposes of determining the
impact of insider trading is not the 'float' in the particular security, but rather
the total of all other investment opportunities with a similar relationship
between risk and return," the supply change occasioned by insider trading "is
simply too small to have any but a transitory, and probably insignificant,
impact on the price of the security"); see also R.A. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOcKS 35-44 (2d ed. 1983) (making a similar
point); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary
Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 335-36
(making a similar point).
264. The trading and reservation price-adjustment that occurs following
insider trades is "derivatively informed," for it is based on information inferred
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engage in "trade decoding" whereby they deduce binary information
regarding a firm's prospects (i.e., that they are either improving or
worsening) from insiders' trades.265
The problem with trade
decoding, Gilson and Kraakman argued, is that "uninformed traders
must be able to identify informed traders individually and observe
their trading activities directly,"266 and they are somewhat limited in
their ability to do so because not all trades by insiders must be
disclosed to the market, and those that must be disclosed need not
be disclosed immediately.2 6 7 Non-insiders may also engage in "price
decoding," whereby they observe a price change occasioned by
insider trading of a sufficient volume, compare the price change to
the public information concerning the firm's prospects, and infer
what possible new information would successfully explain observed
price changes.2 8
Trade decoding and price decoding differ in terms of their
preconditions (i.e., what is required in order for each to occur?) and
their effects (i.e., what information does each convey?). With respect
to preconditions, trade decoding requires some identification of
insider trades,269 while price decoding does not require such
identification, 270 but instead requires trading of a quantity sufficient
2711
to cause some sort of change in price or observable trading volume.
With respect to the level of information provided, trade decoding
reveals only whether a firm's prospects are improving or declining,
whereas price decoding provides information regarding why the
firm's prospects are changing. 272
In light of these differences, trade decoding is more likely to be

from facts related to the trading of others. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note
37, at 572-79 (describing derivatively informed trading).
265. Id. at 573 ("Trade decoding occurs whenever uninformed traders glean
trading information by directly observing the transactions of informed
traders.").
266. Id. at 574.
267. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2006) (requiring only that
officers, directors, and ten percent shareholders-no other insiders-disclose
their trades in their own company's securities within two business days).
268. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 575 (describing price decoding).
269. Id. at 574 ("[U]ninformed traders must be able to identify informed
traders individually and observe their trading activities directly.").
270. Id. at 574-75 (noting that price decoding "does not require uninformed
traders to discover the identity of their informed cohorts").
271. Id. at 575 (summarizing "the logic of price decoding" as follows: "When
trading on inside information is of sufficient volume to cause a change in price,
this otherwise inexplicable change may itself signal the presence of new
information to the uninformed.").
272. Id. at 575-76 (explaining that price decoding may permit investors to
determine the actual content of the information generating insider trades).
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the means by which insider trading would reduce the price of
overvalued equity.
Correction of overvaluation requires only that
investors know that insiders believe-and are willing to bet money
on the fact-that their firm is overvalued. Because investors need
not know the reason for the insiders' belief, the enhanced
information provided by price decoding is of little value if the goal is
simply to align price with fundamental value.2 74 Moreover, the
precondition for trade decoding is more likely to be met than the
precondition for price decoding. It is unlikely that insiders believing
a firm to be overvalued will sell enough stock to move the market
price by altering supply. 275 It is more likely that insider sales (or

purchases of put options) will be revealed to the market. First,
insiders'tran
brokers
to share information regarding insider
ns
actiw thmay tend
1
271
transactions with others.
Second, many insiders (officers,
directors, and shareholders owning at least ten percent of voting
securities) will have to disclose their sales within two business days
pursuant to Exchange Act Section 16(a),277 a provision that has been
rather markedly amended since Gilson and Kraakman opined that
trade decoding would be unlikely to occur in a timely fashion.278
273. Id. at 631-32 (arguing that trade decoding is the primary means by
which insider trading leads to market efficiency).
274. This is simply an application of F.A. Hayek's famous point that for
efficiency purposes it is not necessary for decisionmakers to know why
willingness to pay for a commodity has changed, but merely that it has. See
Hayek, supra note 34, at 525 ("It is always a question of the relative importance
of the particular things with which he is concerned, and the causes which alter
their relative importance are of no interest to him beyond the effect on those
concrete things of his own environment.").
275. See supra note 263 (noting the unlikelihood that non-transitory stock
price changes could be occasioned by supply effects resulting from insider
transactions).
276. This is an instance of what Gilson and Kraakman term "pure"
informational leakage. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 572-73.
277. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(a)(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 2006).
278. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002), amended Section 16(a) to require that insider transactions be reported
within two business days, that they be reported electronically (so the SEC could
quickly make them public), and that they be posted on the relevant
corporation's Internet website at the time of reporting. See 15 U.S.C.A. §
78p(a)(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 2006) (reflecting Sarbanes-Oxley amendments).
Prior to this amendment, Section 16(a) permitted paper filing, did not require
disclosure at the corporate level, and required reporting to the SEC only by the
tenth day of the month following the transaction at issue (so up to forty days
could pass before insider trades were publicly reported). See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)
(2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 403(a), 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (current
version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(a)(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 2006)). Thus, Gilson and
Kraakman argued (in 1984) that "while certain insiders are currently required
by Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act to disclose their trading,
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Of course, the easier it is for market participants to identify
instances of insider selling (and thus to engage in trade decoding),
the more likely price correction is to occur, and to do so rapidly.27 9
Thus, a corporation seeking to prevent the overvaluation of its stock
by liberalizing price-decreasing insider trading would probably
adopt procedures that would ensure that such trades could quickly
be identified by traders. It might, for example, require its agents to
report their sales (or purchases of put options) immediately, or it
might require agents to funnel all such transactions through
particular brokers who would immediately report the transactions
as a matter of course. The firm would also ensure that the reported
information was publicized as quickly as possible, perhaps by
maintaining a constantly updated Internet site cataloguing insider
stock sales and put option purchases.
Analysts following the
company, then, could monitor the site for interesting trades (i.e.,
large sales or put purchases by employees in a position to know
some sort of price-decreasing information) and could direct their
28 0
clients to trade in accordance with the information they gleaned.
In short, most firms would elect a policy that permitted immediately
disclosed price-decreasing insider trading.
2.

PotentialProblems

The primary objective of a corporate policy liberalizing pricedecreasing insider trading could be achieved only if corporate
insiders would actually engage in such trading. Moreover, the
liberalized insider trading policy would be counterproductive if the
value enhancement occasioned by preventing and reducing
overvaluation were outweighed by value destruction resulting from
an increase in corporate mismanagement. Critics may therefore
contend that (1) corporate insiders would not engage in pricedecreasing insider trading even if permitted to do so, or (2) the value

disclosure is required only some ten to forty days after the trade, hardly an aid
to efficient operation of the derivatively informed trading mechanism." Gilson
& Kraakman, supra note 37, at 632 (footnotes omitted).
279. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 868 ("The greater the ability of
market participants to identify insider trading, the more information such
trading will convey."); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 631-32 ("[Tlhe
greater the number of uninformed traders who are able to learn the identity of
insider traders, the size of their trades, and other derivative information, the
more effectively the derivatively informed trading mechanism will operate and
the greater will be the market's relative efficiency with respect to the inside
information.").
280. A number of private services compile information on insider trading
reports and distribute it to market participants. See Fried, supra note 262, at
324.
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loss resulting from authorizing price-decreasing insider trading
would outweigh any value enhancement occasioned by reducing the
incidence and magnitude of equity overvaluation. Neither criticism
undermines the case for liberalizing price-decreasing insider
trading.
a. Would Insiders Actually Engage in Disclosed Trading?
There are several reasons to doubt that price-decreasing insider
trading, even if authorized, would be widespread. In many (perhaps
most) corporate cultures, betting against the company would be
considered treasonous, and insiders considering whether to engage
in price-decreasing insider trading might be concerned about
negative job repercussions. 281 Perhaps more importantly, insiders
may forego price-decreasing insider trading because they personally
stand to benefit from overvalued equity. Many insiders attain
reputational benefits from being associated with a firm with a high
stock price,282 and, of course, the value of their holdings of company
stock is enhanced, at least temporarily, if the stock is overvalued.
Thus, even if they know the mispricing will eventually be corrected,
one might expect them to hold on to appreciating stock for as long as
possible so as to maximize their trading gains. In addition, insiders
may worry that a price correction will result in a corporate shake-up
that threatens their jobs or compensation.283 Therefore, one might
question whether insiders who knew of overvaluation would reveal
it by engaging in authorized trading.
Insiders likely would, for the temptation of financial rewards
would probably overwhelm the forces stifling price-decreasing
insider trading. A company that had adopted a policy liberalizing
such trading would have made an apparent attempt to alter the
corporate norms against betting against the company, so insiders
considering whether to engage in price-decreasing insider trading
would have received an implicit green light from their principals.
Undoubtedly, some corporations would adopt an official policy
allowing price-decreasing insider trading, while simultaneously
maintaining a corporate norm that such trading is improper, but
such a clandestine norm would be difficult to maintain. In the end,
the constant allure of potential insider trading profits (which grow
as the extent of overvaluation increases), coupled with the
corporation's official imprimatur on price-decreasing insider trading,
would likely lead to defections by rogue insiders who would have
strong grounds for attacking any apparently retaliatory employment
281. Cf SUROWIECKI, supra note 55, at 224-28 (discussing powerful social
norms against short-selling).
282. See supranotes 141-43 and accompanying text.
283. This is a version of the "last period" problem discussed supra at notes
62-63 and accompanying text.
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decision. Corporate norms against price-decreasing insider trading,
then, likely pose little barrier to the success of a liberalized insider
trading policy.
Nor is it likely that insiders would collusively refrain from
engaging in price-decreasing insider trading in order to maintain
and enhance a high stock price. As antitrust scholars have long
noted, cartels are inherently unstable. 84 Because the first colluder
to defect gains a disproportionate share of any surplus created by
the collusion, each participant has a private incentive to be the first
defector. 28 5 With price-fixing, the first cartel member to lower his
price from the agreed-upon level stands to steal business from all
other participants, so cheating (or the possibility thereof) usually
undermines a cartel. 2 6 Here, the first insider to engage in disclosed
price-decreasing insider trading would make the most money on her
sale, for after the initial instance of such trading, the price at which
subsequent sales could be consummated would likely be reduced.
Each insider colluding to keep the stock price inflated would
therefore face a private incentive to be the first defector.2 7 And, of
course, the magnitude of this incentive would grow as the
discrepancy between price and value expanded. Any conspiracy to
refrain from price-decreasing insider trading is therefore likely to
fail.
Ultimately, a policy liberalizing price-decreasing insider trading
provides a means of rewarding whistleblowers with a "bounty" for
conveying information (via their trading) that the stock price is
overvalued. In many-perhaps most-cases, the price inflation will
be due to some concealment by insiders. Thus, in authorizing
publicly disclosed price-decreasing insider trading, a corporation
would be putting in place a bounty system designed to promote
284. Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEx. L. REV.
515, 518 (2004); see also Alexis Jacquemin & Margaret E. Slade, Cartels,
Collusion, and Horizontal Merger, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATIONS 416, 420-21 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds.,
1989) (explaining how incentives to cheat render cartels inherently unstable).
285. See Leslie, supra note 284, at 518-19 (2004) (observing that "cartels are
inherently unstable" because members have an incentive to cheat by defecting
or reporting the cartel).
286. PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, & JOHN L. SOLOW, ANTITRUST
LAW, para. 405b2, at 25 (1995) ("[P]rice fixing often carries the seeds of its own

destruction. For the effect of fixing a price well above costs is to induce each
collaborator to try to win additional sales.").
287. Cf. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 874 ("Collusion to decrease the
value of the firm among managers in pursuit of trading profits is unlikely to
succeed because, as in all cartels, each rational member will cheat insofar as
the gains to a lone cheater from exposing others will exceed his gains from
collusion.").
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candor by rewarding insiders who blow the whistle on nondisclosure
of material information. The financial rewards available from this
sort of bounty scheme (which is a well-established means of
combating fraud.8 and would be valued by investors) would likely
drive knowledgeable insiders to engage in price-decreasing insider
trading, despite any informal corporate norms or collusive
tendencies that might discourage such trading.
b.
What About
Corporate Mismanagement and/or
Impairment of Intra-FirmInformation Flow? Even if one were
confident that insiders would engage in authorized price-decreasing
insider trading, thereby reducing the incidence and magnitude of
overvalued equity, one might still oppose trading liberalization if it
threatens to cause value-reducing actions by insiders. At least two
types of conduct are potentially troubling. First, authorizing pricedecreasing insider trading may create a perverse incentive for
insiders to create conditions that reduce stock price and then to
trade before the stock price falls.8 9 Second, liberalizing such trading
may impair the intra-firm flow of important information, for
insiders at each level within the corporate hierarchy may delay the
transmission of negative information until they have traded on the
bad news.29 °
If the investor losses occasioned by deliberate
mismanagement and/or delayed disclosure outweigh the value of
gains resulting from reducing equity overvaluation, a policy
liberalizing price-decreasing insider trading will not be optimal.
In actuality, there is probably little reason to worry about
deliberate mismanagement or delayed disclosure. As Carlton and
Fischel have observed, mismanagement occasioned by the possibility
of gains from price-decreasing insider trading is unlikely because
corporate managers, who generally work in teams, cannot engage in
value-destroying mismanagement without persuading their
colleagues to go along with the strategy, and any particular
employee's ability to engage in mismanagement will therefore be
constrained by his colleagues' attempts to maximize firm value or to

288. For example, the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act permit a
private plaintiff to bring a civil action under the Act on behalf of the
government, and if the action is successful, the private plaintiff receives a
statutory bounty from the government's recovery. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2000).
See generally AM. BAR ASS'N,

QuI TAM

LITIGATION UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT

(Howard W. Cox & Peter B. Hutt II eds., 2d ed. 1999).
289. One of the chief arguments against deregulating insider trading in
general is that such deregulation would create perverse incentives for managers
to create "bad news" upon which they could earn trading profits. See supra note
14 and accompanying text. See generally Levmore, supra note 14; Mendelson,
supra note 14; Schotland, supra note 3.
290. See Haft, supra note 13.
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gain personally by exposing proposed mismanagement.29 ' Moreover,
if trades must be immediately disclosed, as would be likely,292 any
traders responsible for causing a stock price to fall would be
exposed. Both senior managers and plaintiffs' lawyers are likely to
pay keen attention to trading disclosures. If an insider's trade were
followed by a stock price decrease, and the insider's position within
the firm suggested that he had some control over the business
decision(s) that reduced the firm's value, he would likely be subject
to adverse employment action or, if he were senior enough, to a
derivative suit. 293 Similarly, if an insider were to delay disclosure of
negative information in order to trade on it first, his superiors could
easily note the timing of his trade and, if the delay harmed (or could
have harmed) the enterprise,294 would likely punish the offender. In
short, publicity will police instances of deliberate mismanagement
and delay in conveying information.
Of course, the ultimate rejoinder to claims that the liberalized
price-decreasing insider trading policy proposed herein will reduce
corporate value is that the proposed policy is merely a default rule.
If a corporation finds that the costs associated with liberalizing
price-decreasing insider trading exceed the benefits to investors, it
will likely jettison the policy, for competitive capital markets
encourage firms to minimize their costs of capital by adopting
insider trading policies that maximize firm value. 295 This Article
argues that most firms would likely adopt a policy permitting pricedecreasing insider trading while generally banning price-increasing
insider trading. If that rule is adopted as the default policy, firms

291. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 874 ("[TIhe ability of any one
manager to pursue bad opportunities will be constrained because other
managers and employees will attempt to maximize the firm's value.").
292. See supra notes 260-80 and accompanying text (arguing that firms
adopting a policy liberalizing price-decreasing insider trading would likely
require contemporaneous disclosure of such trades).
293. Plaintiffs' lawyers are the driving force behind most derivative
litigation. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 367 ("[TIhe real party in interest-

the party on the plaintiffs' side with the greatest personal interest in the
outcome of the [derivative] litigation-is the plaintiffs' attorney rather than the
nominal shareholder-plaintiff."). Under a regime permitting publicized pricedecreasing insider trading, those attorneys would likely follow insider trading
disclosures and initiate actions against insiders who appear to have contributed
to value-reducing corporate decisions.
294. Given the speed with which securities trades can be executed, delaying
conveyance of information in order to first trade on it likely would have little
adverse effect on the intra-firm flow of information.
295. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 862-63 ("If it is bad, firms that
allow insider trading will be at a competitive disadvantage compared with firms
that curtail insider trading.").

HeinOnline -- 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1113 2006

1114

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

discovering that liberalization creates greater losses than benefits
can-and will-adopt more restrictive policies.296 In particular, they
may limit by contract the class of insiders permitted to engage in
price-decreasing insider trading. They may decide, for example,
that senior managers, who are best able to create bad news, should
not be permitted to engage in such trading. Capital market
pressure will lead them to adopt the trading restrictions most
favored by investors.
III. THE LEGAL FEASIBILITY OF AN ASYMMETRIC
INSIDER TRADING REGIME

Part II argued that an asymmetric insider trading regime, in
which price-decreasing insider trading is treated more leniently
than the price-increasing variety, is the majoritarian default-the
bargain managers and investors would likely strike were they able
to negotiate freely. This Part argues that such an asymmetric
regime is feasible under current insider trading doctrine, even if
unclear issues raised by current doctrine are resolved in a manner
that is fairly hostile to efforts to contract out of insider trading
liability.
In order to articulate this legal argument, I must begin with a
brief summary of insider trading doctrine. Readers familiar with
the relevant legal rules may wish to skip Part III.A, which describes
current insider trading doctrine, and proceed directly to Part III.B,
which explains why an asymmetric insider trading regime would be
permissible under current law. 7
296. Of course, a corollary to this position is that the ban on price-increasing
insider trading should also be waiveable. If a corporation were to discover that
the costs associated with price-increasing insider trading (e.g., the potential for
squandered corporate opportunities, see supra notes 218-23 and accompanying
text) were outweighed by benefits (e.g., lower salary requirements for
managers, see supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text), the corporation
should be permitted to opt out of the ban on price-increasing insider trading.
Carlton and Fischel have argued for this type of private contractual approach to
insider trading. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 861-66. While I am
entirely sympathetic to their position, my point here is merely that an
asymmetric insider trading policy permitting price-decreasing but not priceincreasing insider trading is likely the policy most corporate constituents would
bargain for if legally and practically able to do so and therefore ought to be
adopted as the default policy. Moreover, for reasons explained below, the
asymmetric insider trading policy proposed herein could be adopted under
current law. See infra notes 343-69 and accompanying text. By contrast, the
purely contractual approach advocated by Carlton and Fischel probably is not
achievable under current law. See infra note 358 and accompanying text.
297. While current law would permit authorized price-decreasing insider
trading, the SEC, which has a long history of seeking to expand the insider
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PrevailingLegal Doctrine

Insider trading, generally defined as trading in securities while
in possession of material, nonpublic information,2 98 may run afoul of
several provisions of federal
law. In addition to Section 16(b) of the
S299
Securities Exchange Act,
which posits a prophylactic ban on
"short-swing profits" earned by certain insiders trading in their own
companies' stock,3 °0 there are three basic theories under which
trading on inside information may violate federal law. 30 1 Two of
these theories, the "disclose or abstain" rule (also called the
"classical theory") and the misappropriation doctrine, derive from
Securities Exchange Rule 10b-5, 30 2 which is a general anti-fraud rule
that was promulgated pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act. 3 The third theory derives from Securities Exchange
Rule 14e-3, °4 a more narrowly tailored rule that was promulgated
under Exchange Act Section 14(e).30 5
1.

The Disclose or Abstain Rule

When it applies, the disclose or abstain rule requires a trader
possessing material, nonpublic information either to disclose her
inside information before trading or to abstain from trading
altogether.0 6 The rule had its genesis in Texas Gulf Sulphur, 7
trading prohibition, would probably pursue legal action against corporations
that attempted to authorize such trading and/or against the insiders who
traded pursuant to such authorization. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 583-86
(discussing regulators' zeal to expand insider trading prohibition beyond limits
of enabling statute). Accordingly, corporations are unlikely to authorize pricedecreasing insider trading, despite the likely legality of such trading, absent
express approval of such trading by regulators.
298. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 773.
299. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000).
300. Section 16(b) requires a defined set of corporate insiders (directors,
officers, and shareholders possessing at least ten percent of voting securities) to
disgorge profits on any set of purchase and sale transactions occurring within a
six month period. Id. § 78p(b). This disgorgement requirement applies
regardless of whether the statutory insider traded on the basis of, or even
possessed, material nonpublic information. It therefore is not an insider
trading ban per se.
301. Insider trading may also violate federal mail and wire fraud laws, but
the theory of fraud under those provisions mirrors the two theories under
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 and will not be discussed here. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(2000) (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (wire fraud); LouIs Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 741-43 (3d ed. 1995).
302. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
303. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
304. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a).
305. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
306. See generally BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 531-37 (discussing the
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discussed above, in which the Second Circuit held that insiders of
a corporation that owned land upon which a valuable mineral
deposit was discovered had violated Rule 10b-5 by purchasing stock
of their company prior to public disclosure of the ore strike.3 9 This
duty to disclose or abstain, the court reasoned, was inherent in Rule
10b-5's underlying policy of protecting "the justifiable expectation of
the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal
3 10
material information.
equal access
relatively
exchanges have
In Ciarela
v Unied
311 to
In Chiarella v. United States, the Supreme Court expressed
approval of a disclose or abstain rule, but found it to be based not on
some implicit policy of equal access to information but instead on
the fiduciary relationship existing between a corporate insider and
her trading partner. 312 The Court reasoned that Rule 10b-5's
prohibition on fraud is violated when a corporate insider, who owes
a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders, purchases stock
from a shareholder without first informing her of material,
nonpublic information of which the insider is aware.313 The fraud, of
course, is not an affirmative misrepresentation (assuming the
insider did not actually lie about the information to which he was
privy), but is instead failure to speak in the face of a duty to do so.3' 4
disclose or abstain rule). In a face-to-face transaction, the information must be
disclosed, prior to trading, directly to the insider's trading partner. If the
transaction is accomplished on an impersonal stock exchange, as most
securities transactions are, the information must first be publicly disclosed via
some broad medium (e.g., a newswire).
307. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
308. See supra notes 217-22 and accompanying text.
309. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 852.
310. Id. at 848 (holding that, in light of Rule 10b-5's underlying policy of
equal access to information, "anyone in possession of material inside
information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled
from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to
do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned
while such inside information remains undisclosed.").
311. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
312. Id. at 235 ("We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise
from the mere possession of nonpublic market information."); id. at 233
(declining to recognize "a general duty between all participants in market
transactions to forgo actions based on material, non-public information" because
"[flormulation of such a broad duty, which departs radically from the
established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between two
parties . . . should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of

congressional intent").
313. Id. at 227-30 (explaining how fraud may result from nondisclosure by
corporate insider who is a fiduciary of his trading partner).
314. Id. at 228 ("[O]ne who fails to disclose material information prior to the
consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to
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The duty to speak, the Court reasoned, arises from the fiduciary
Accordingly, the
relationship between insider and trader.315
Chiarella defendant, an employee of a printing firm hired to assist
the buyer in a corporate acquisition, could not have violated Rule
10b-5 by purchasing stock of the target corporation, for he was not a
fiduciary of the target corporation's shareholders and thus had no
duty to disclose the nonpublic information in his possession. 316 The
Court's reasoning implied, though, that corporate insiders
possessing material, nonpublic information would violate Rule 10b-5
if they traded in their company's stock without first disclosing their
inside information.
The Chiarella Court's conclusion that a fiduciary relationship
created the insider's duty to disclose or abstain reined in Texas Gulf
Sulphur, which would have imposed such a duty whenever anyone
with material, nonpublic information traded with anyone else. A
subsequent Court decision showed, however, that the disclose or
abstain duty still applies fairly broadly. In Dirks v. SEC,3 7 the
Court posited two rules that expanded the reach of the disclose or
abstain rule. First, the Court noted that nominal outsiders whose
relationship with the corporation is sufficiently close (e.g., lawyers,
underwriters, consultants) may be deemed "constructive insiders,"
and therefore may be subject to the disclose or abstain rule.318 In
addition, the Court reasoned that under certain circumstances the
rule will apply to outsider "tippees" who receive material, nonpublic
information from actual or constructive insiders. 9
Despite its expansion in Dirks, the disclose or abstain rule left a
substantial loophole in the insider trading liability scheme. If the
duty to disclose or abstain, and thus potential insider trading
liability, arises from the fiduciary relationship between a corporate

do so.").
315. Id. at 227 ("That the relationship between a corporate insider and the
stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obligation is not a novel
twist of the law.").
316. Id. at 231-35 (explaining basis of reversal of defendant's conviction).
317. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
318. Id. at 655 n.14 ("Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate
information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or
consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries
of the shareholders.").
319. The Court explained:
[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a
corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when
[1] the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by
disclosing the information to the tippee and [2] the tippee knows or
should know that there has been a breach.
Id. at 660.
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insider and her trading partner, individuals who are neither
insiders (actual or constructive) nor tippees ("inheritors" of an
insider's fiduciary duty) may freely trade on the basis of material,
nonpublic information. For example, an attorney representing the
bidder in a forthcoming tender offer could freely purchase stock of
the target corporation prior to the announcement of the tender offer,
for the attorney would not owe her trading partner a duty to disclose
and thus could not be liable for fraud. To respond to this loophole,
the SEC adopted Rule 14e-3 and pressed the Supreme Court to
approve the "misappropriation doctrine."
2.

Rule 14e-3
Rule 14e-3,3 20 adopted pursuant to the SEC's statutory authority
to "prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent" fraud in
connection with a tender offer,32' prohibits anyone with knowledge of
a forthcoming tender offer from trading on that information prior to
public disclosure of the offer.32 2 The rule thus closes the loophole left
by Chiarella and Dirks, but only with respect to inside information
related to tender offers. The rule does not ban trading by outsiders
on the basis of nonpublic information that is not related to a
forthcoming tender offer.
3. The MisappropriationDoctrine
The misappropriation doctrine aims to close the loophole left by
Rule 14e-3. Under the misappropriation theory, a person who
receives material, nonpublic information via a fiduciary or
confidential relationship defrauds the source of her information if
she trades upon it without first informing that source of her
intention to do so."' The SEC had articulated the misappropriation
theory in Chiarella, arguing before the Supreme Court that the
defendant's secret trading amounted to fraud against the source of
his nonpublic information and thus gave rise to a violation of Rule

320. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2006).
321. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2000).
322. Specifically, the rule states that if an offeror has taken "a substantial
step" toward making a tender offer, anyone who has learned of the forthcoming
offer from the offeror, the offeree, or an agent of either must refrain from
trading in the securities of either (unless one of the narrow, enumerated
exceptions applies) until there has been public disclosure of the offer "by press
release or otherwise." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a). Moreover, insiders of a bidder
or target may not divulge confidential information about a tender offer to
persons who are likely to violate the rule by trading on the basis of that
information. Id. § 240.14e-3(d).
323. See infra notes 336-40 and accompanying text.
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10b-5.324 While four justices accepted the theory,325 the Chiarella
majority declined to base liability upon it because it had not been
presented to the jury. 26 The Second Circuit, however, approved the
misappropriation theory as a basis for Rule 10b-5 liability in United
States v. Newman3 27 and relied upon the theory in several other
insider trading cases. 328
The Supreme Court eventually approved the theory in United
States v. O'Hagan.329

Defendant O'Hagan's law firm, Dorsey &

Whitney, had been retained to assist Grand Metropolitan PLC with
a possible tender offer for Pillsbury Company.
Because of his
position at the firm, O'Hagan learned of Grand Metropolitan's plans
and, unbeknownst to his partners or Grand Metropolitan, purchased
Pillsbury call options and shares.3
When the tender offer was
announced, Pillsbury stock soared, enabling O'Hagan to reap a $4.3
million profit.
The government quickly charged O'Hagan with
insider trading.333 It could not, however, establish a claim under the
classical disclose or abstain rule approved in Chiarella,for O'Hagan
was not a fiduciary of his trading partners (Pillsbury shareholders
and call writers) and thus could not have defrauded them by failing
to speak in the face of a duty to do so. 3 ' The government therefore
charged O'Hagan with violations of federal mail fraud statutes and
Rule 14e-3. 335 It also asserted that he violated Rule 10b-5 by
deceiving the sources of his inside information-his law firm (Dorsey
& Whitney) and its client (Grand Metropolitan), both of whom he
owed fiduciary duties.336 A jury convicted O'Hagan on all counts.337
In affirming O'Hagan's conviction, the Supreme Court expressly
approved the government's assertion that "a person commits fraud
324. See Brief of the United States at 28-37, Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222 (1980) (No. 78-1202), 1979 WL 199454.
325. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 239-46 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 235-36.
327. 664 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1981).
328. See, e.g., U.S. v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affd on other
grounds, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
329. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
330. Id. at 647.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 648.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 653 n.5 ("The Government could not have prosecuted O'Hagan
under the classical theory, for O'Hagan was not an 'insider' of Pillsbury, the
corporation in whose stock he traded.").
335. Id. at 648-49.
336. Id. at 648, 653.
337. Id. at 649.
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'in connection with' a securities transaction, and thereby violates
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed
to the source of the information."338 Such a trader "deal[s] in
deception," the Court stated, because he feigns loyalty to his source
while actually using confidential information for his own selfserving purposes.
Because this feigned loyalty occurs "in
connection with" a sale or purchase of a security, the Court
reasoned, it violates Rule 10b-5. 340 The Court thus recognized the
misappropriation theory as a "complement" to the classical disclose
or abstain theory. In the latter, securities fraud occurs because the
trader fails to disclose information to his trading partner, of whom
he is a fiduciary; in the former, securities fraud occurs because the
trader "feign[s] fidelity to the source" of his information, a source to
whom he owes fiduciary duties. 341 The Court was careful to note,
though, that there can be no liability under the misappropriation
theory when the trader first informs his source of his intention to
trade on the source's information.342
B. The Permissibilityof (Authorized)Price-DecreasingInsider
Trading Under CurrentLegal Doctrine
The liability scheme described in Part III.A leaves open two
questions that affect the legality of authorized price-decreasing
insider trading. First, does Rule 10b-5 prohibit only "deceptive"
insider trading, or does the rule reach all instances of classical
insider trading that involve a breach of fiduciary duty?34 3 Second, if
338. Id. at 652.
339. Id. at 653-54.
340. Id. at 655-56 ("This ['in connection with'] element is satisfied because
the fiduciary's fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the
confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses
the information to purchase or sell securities. The securities transaction and
the breach of duty thus coincide.").
341. Id. at 655. The Court explained:
The two theories are complementary, each addressing efforts to
capitalize on nonpublic information through the purchase or sale of
securities. The classical theory targets a corporate insider's breach of
duty to shareholders with whom the insider transacts; the
misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic
information by a corporate "outsider" in breach of a duty owed not to a
trading party, but to the source of the information.
Id. at 652-53.
342. Id. at 655 ("Because the deception essential to the misappropriation
theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary
discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the non-public information,
there is no 'deceptive device' and thus no § 10(b) violation .... ").
343. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 548-49 (observing that O'Hagan left
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the latter, are the relevant fiduciary duties purely contractual in
nature? 441 Part III.B examines the legality of authorized pricedecreasing insider trading given the possible answers to these two
open questions of law. It concludes that such trading is legally
permissible under all three possible legal scenarios: where the law
forbids only deceptive insider trading (Part III.B.1); where even
candid (i.e., non-deceptive) classical insider trading is forbidden but
fiduciary duties are contractual in nature (Part III.B.2); and where
the law forbids candid classical insider trading and fiduciary duties
are not purely matters of contract (Part III.B.3).
1.

If Only Deceptive Insider Trading Is Forbidden

Professor Saikrishna Prakash has argued persuasively that
"candid" insider trading-insider trading in which the insider has
stated up front that she may trade on the basis of material,
nonpublic information-cannot violate Rule 10b-5.343
Prakash
reasons that Rule 10b-5 and its enabling statute prohibit only
intentional misrepresentations, not mere breaches of fiduciary
duty. 6 Thus, insider trading that involves a breach of fiduciary
duty to a trading partner or information source, but does not involve
feigned fidelity to that person, simply cannot violate Rule 10b-5
(unless, of course, the trading involves some other form of fraud).347

open whether a "brazen misappropriator" could violate Rule 10b-5 and whether
"authorized trading" could give rise to liability under the classical theory).
344. See Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated
Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 539 (1997) (discussing "the long-standing
debate between those who have argued that fiduciary duties are and should be
essentially contractual in nature and those who argue for some restrictions on
waiving those duties") (footnote omitted).
345. See Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1495 (1999).
346. Id. at 1510 ("O'Hagan correctly reaffirms that a breach of fiduciary
duty is simply not enough for misappropriation or Rule 10b-5 liability; a
deception is necessary."). The Supreme Court first established that § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 do not prohibit mere breaches of fiduciary duty in Santa Fe Indus. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977), in which the Court held that controlling
shareholders who breached a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders by
offering allegedly inadequate consideration in a short-form merger would not,
absent deception, transgress Rule 10b-5. Id. The Court explained:
The language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant
to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception. ...
Thus the claim of fraud and fiduciary breach in this complaint states
a cause of action under any part of Rule 10b-5 only if the conduct
alleged can be fairly viewed as "manipulative or deceptive" within the
meaning of the statute.
Id. at 473-74.
347. Prakash, supra note 345, at 1510-12.
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Such trading may be punishable under state laws governing
fiduciary duties, but it is not fraudulent.
The primary basis for Prakash's claim that Rule 10b-5 does not
reach candid trading is the reasoning of the Supreme Court's
O'Hagan decision. 4 8 In that decision, the Court (1) reiterated that
the deception involved in insider trading is what causes such
trading to run afoul of Rule 10b-5;349 (2) clarified that the deception
at issue in a misappropriation case is the trader's "feigning fidelity"
to the source of her information;35 0 and (3) conceded that a
misappropriator who informed her source of her intention to trade
before actually doing so could not violate Rule 10b-5 (though she
might be liable for breach of fiduciary duty). 5' Prakash concludes
that such reasoning must similarly apply in classical (i.e., disclose or
abstain) insider trading cases: since deception must be present for
there to be a violation of Rule 10b-5, and since the deception at issue
in a classical insider trading case is feigned fidelity to the trading
partner, an insider may avoid liability under Rule 10b-5 by stating
prior to trading that she intends to trade on the basis of material,

348. Id. at 1510 ("Properly understood, [O'Hagan] indicates that classical
insiders may avoid Rule 10b-5 liability even when they trade on material, nonpublic information on an anonymous exchange, so long as they do not deceive
their shareholders."). Prakash also cites pre-O'Hagan appeals court cases in
support of his decision. See id. at 1507-09 (citing Jensen v. Kimble, 1 F.3d 1073
(10th Cir. 1993); McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos., 26 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1994)). In
Jensen, the Tenth Circuit held that a purported insider's failure to disclose
certain material, nonpublic information prior to trading did not violate Rule
10b-5 because the trader openly revealed his "failure to disclose" further
information. Jensen, 1 F.3d at 1078. The court explained that when "the nondisclosing party explicitly informs the other party of his failure to disclose
[material, nonpublic information], an omission will not be misleading in the
absence of special circumstances." Id. In McCormick, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that a company's candid refusal to disclose all material, nonpublic
information prior to purchasing its shares did not mislead a "sophisticated"
seller. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 884. Prakash argues that the reasoning of
Jensen and McCormick adds further support to the view that candid insider
trading, even if it violates a fiduciary duty, cannot violate Rule 10b-5. Prakash,
supra note 345, at 1509.
349. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997) ("§ 10(b) is not an
all-purpose breach of fiduciary duty ban; rather, it trains on conduct involving
manipulation or deception.").
350. Id. ("[T]he deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves
feigning fidelity to the source of information....").
351. Id. ("Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory
involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses
to the source that he plans to trade on the non-public information, there is no
'deceptive device' and thus no § 10(b) violation-although the fiduciary-turnedtrader may remain liable under state law for breach of a duty of loyalty.").
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nonpublic information. 52 Such an admission, which would preclude
the feigned fidelity that gives rise to Rule 10b-5 liability, could be
made by the insider to her trading partner in a face-to-face
transaction or by the insider to the market in general (via public
disclosure) in an exchange transaction.353
Moreover, if the
corporation announced generally that its agents may trade on the
basis of material, nonpublic information, then the agents, in doing
so, would not be feigning fidelity to their trading partners, who
would be on notice that corporate agents might buy from or sell to
them on the basis of inside information. 54
Under Prakash's
interpretation of post-O'Hagan insider trading doctrine, then, a
corporation would be free to adopt a policy authorizing pricedecreasing insider trading, and an insider who traded pursuant to
such policy would not violate Rule 10b-5.
While Prakash's understanding of insider trading doctrine is
intuitively appealing (and would appear to be the only
interpretation that can make sense of O'Hagan's dictum regarding
authorized trading 35 5), it has not garnered a wide following. No postO'Hagan decision has approved Prakash's reasoning, and most
commentators that have considered his position have suggested that
it would not be accepted by the Supreme Court, which would likely
confine O'Hagan's reasoning to misappropriation cases.356 Thus, we
352. Prakash, supra note 345, at 1515 ("After disclosing an intent to trade
on material, non-public information to the shareholders, any insider breach can
no longer be considered concealed or deceptive. It is out in the open.").
353. Id. at 1516-18 (discussing various ways disclosure of intent to trade
might occur).
354. Id. at 1516 ("[I]f company Y authorizes X's insider trades, later trades
certainly cannot be considered fraudulent."). Moreover, if the corporation had
previously announced that its insiders may trade on the basis of material,
nonpublic information, then an outsider trader's reliance on any belief
regarding insiders' "fidelity" would not be justifiable and thus could not support
a fraud claim.
355. See supra note 351.
356. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path
Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L.
REV. 1589, 1647-48 (1999) (acknowledging that O'Hagan's reasoning would
seem to suggest that candid classical insider trading does not violate Rule 10b5, but predicting that the Supreme Court would eschew such a position);
Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital Markets, 35 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 533, 568 n.141 (2002) (noting Prakash's position and responding
that "it is doubtful that courts would accept a one-time blanket statement of an
intent to trade as equivalent to the disclosure of the actual material non-public
information upon which insiders seek to trade"); Zohar Goshen & Gideon
Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and "Negative"Property Rights in
Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1262 n.108 (2001) ("A proper reading of
O'Hagan implies a key distinction between inside information in the classic
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should consider the legality of authorized price-decreasing insider
trading under a legal regime in which classical insider trading
liability is not limited to deceptive insider trading.
2. If Even Candid ClassicalInsider TradingIs Forbidden,but
FiduciaryDuties Are Contractualin Nature
If the law imposes liability for classical insider trading even if
the possibility of such trading is disclosed in advance (so that the
trader is not feigning fidelity to her trading partner), then the basis
of liability must be something other than fraud. Most likely, the
basis for liability would be some fiduciary duty breach that would be
taken to violate Rule 10b-5.357 If the gravamen of a classical insider
trading claim is breach of fiduciary duty, rather than fraud, then
even authorized price-decreasing insider trading could violate Rule
10b-5 if the trading at issue involved a breach of the requisite duty.
But this assumes that fiduciary duties cannot be altered by
contract, a point upon which legal scholars vehemently disagree.358
sense-information originating from the affected firm used by one of its
insiders-and a different type of inside information-information generated by
outsiders who are not employees of the affected firm. While the prohibition on
trading involving classic inside information is clearly mandatory, and cannot be
contracted around, the prohibition on trading involving information generated
by outsiders is subject to contracting like any other property interest."); Jeanne
L. Schroeder, Envy and Outsider Trading: The Case of Martha Stewart, 26
CARDozo L. REv. 2023, 2055 n.141 (2005) ("[Prakash's position] is incorrect in
that there is no case that follows Prakash's analysis in the case of classic insider
trading (i.e., where the source of the information is the issuer of the
securities)."); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of
Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375, 436 n.271 (1999) ("Wle disagree with the
insidious suggestion that a prior disclosure of an intention to trade on material
nonpublic information or 'candid insider trading' should be countenanced as an
exception.").
357. Hinging Rule 10b-5 liability on a breach of fiduciary duty that does not
amount to actual deception would seem to run afoul of the Supreme Court's
Santa Fe holding. See supra note 346.
358. Compare Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 888 ("Fiduciary duties are
standard-form contractual terms that govern agency relationships. They allow
the parties to avoid excessively lengthy and detailed agreements, thereby
reducing the costs of contracting.") (footnote omitted), Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Contractand FiduciaryDuty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993)
(urging that there is nothing special about fiduciary obligations and positing
that fiduciary obligations arise from "contractual" (and thus consensual)
relations), John H. Langbein, The ContractarianBasis of the Law of Trusts, 105
YALE L.J. 625, 629 (1995) ("The rules of trust fiduciary law mean to capture the
likely understanding of the parties to the trust deal ... "), Ribstein, supra note
344, at 541 (characterizing fiduciary duties as "a hypothetical bargain-that is,
contract terms the parties themselves would have agreed to in the absence of
transaction costs"), and Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of
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Under the view espoused by the "contractarians," who maintain that
fiduciary duties are ultimately contractual in nature, a corporation
could effectively legalize price-decreasing insider trading even if the
gravamen of a classical insider trading violation were breach of
fiduciary duty rather than deception based on feigned fidelity to the
trading partner. By authorizing price-decreasing insider trading,
the corporation would be contractually tailoring the fiduciary duties
its agents owe to shareholders so that those duties would not include
a duty to disclose material, nonpublic information before trading on
it. A shareholder who purchased stock from an informed insider
could not claim fiduciary breach, for the duty owed by the insider
would have been contractually tailored to exclude a disclosure
duty.359 Thus, authorized price-decreasing insider trading is legally
permissible, even if the gravamen of classical insider trading is
breach of fiduciary duty rather than a feigning of fidelity, if
fiduciary duties are contractually alterable.
3. If Even Candid Classical Insider Trading Is Forbidden,
and FiduciaryDuties Are Not Purely Contractual
Under the two legal scenarios considered so far, a corporation
could authorize price-increasing,as well as price-decreasing, insider
trading. Under the first legal scenario (only deceptive trading is
prohibited), authorized price-increasing insider trading would be
insulated because there could be no deception where the seller, in
light of the corporation's ex ante authorization, had no legitimate
expectation that an insider would refrain from buying company
stock on the basis of material, nonpublic information.36 ° Under the
Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians,65 WASH. L. REV. 1

(1990), with Victor Brudney, Contractand FiduciaryDuty in CorporateLaw, 38
B.C. L. REV. 595, 597 (1997) ("[T]o say that a relationship is contractual 'only
begins analysis; it gives direction to further analysis . . . .'"), Alison Grey
Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairnessand CorporateStructure, 25
UCLA L. REV. 738, 781 (1978), Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985), Robert C.
Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985),

John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/EnablingBalance in Corporate Law: An
Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989), Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV.

211, 249-51 (1995), Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of CorporationLaw,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1989), and Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of
FiduciaryDuty in Close Corporations,138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675 (1990).

359. Of course, a buyer who was not already a shareholder of the insider's
company would have no grounds for complaint, for the insider would not be her
fiduciary (and thus would owe her no disclosure duty).
360. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
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second legal scenario (breach of fiduciary duty is the crux of the
violation, but fiduciary duties are ultimately contractual), the
corporation's express authorization of price-increasing insider
trading would effectively tailor insiders' fiduciary duties to exclude
any obligation to disclose nonpublic information before trading.
Suppose, though, that the true state of the law is that (1) even
candid insider trading is forbidden, and (2) fiduciary duties are not
contractually alterable.
Under that legal regime, which is
maximally hostile to a liberalized insider trading policy and appears
to reflect the status quo, authorized price-increasing insider trading
would probably be illegal, but authorized price-decreasing insider
trading would be legally permissible.
First consider why this most restrictive view of the law would
permit authorized price-decreasing insider trading. It is a basic
principle of corporate law that a corporate agent's fiduciary duty is
ultimately owed to the corporation itself, not to individual
shareholders. 6 ' Of course, most agent conduct that might injure an
individual shareholder would also threaten some sort of injury to
the corporation's business operations and/or financial prospects and
would therefore be barred by the agent's fiduciary duty to the
corporation. But where an agent's action might disadvantage an
individual shareholder, but would benefit the corporationas a whole,
the agent's fiduciary duties should not preclude him from taking
361. See Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, 741 F.2d 707, 721 (5th Cir. 1984)
("[D]irectors' duties of loyalty and care run to the corporation, not to individual
shareholders or even to a majority of the shareholders."); Freeman v. Decio, 584
F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir. 1978) (explaining that because fiduciary duties are owed
to the corporation, not to individual shareholders, "the traditional common law
approach has been to permit officers and directors of corporations to trade in
their corporation's securities free from liability to other traders for failing to
disclose inside information"); Schautteet v. Chester State Bank, 707 F. Supp.
885, 888 (E.D. Tex. 1988) ("Officers and directors owe fiduciary duties only to
the corporation."); Bessette v. Bessette, 434 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Mass. 1982)
(providing that fiduciary duty is owed to the corporation, not individuals); Myer
v. Cuevas, 119 S.W.3d 830, 836 (Tex. App. 2003) ("Corporate officers owe
fiduciary duties to the corporations they serve. However corporate officers do
not owe fiduciary duties to individual shareholders unless a contract or special
relationship exists between them in addition to the corporate relationship.")
(citations omitted); Hoggett v. Brown, 971 S.W.2d 472, 488 (Tex. App. 1997) ("A
director's fiduciary duty runs only to the corporation, not to individual
shareholders or even to a majority of the shareholders."); Eric J. Gouvin,
Resolving the Subsidiary Director's Dilemma, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 296 (1996)
([A] director's fiduciary duty runs to the shareholders as a class, and not to
individual shareholders in their personal capacity."). See generally CHARLES
R.T.

O'KELLEY

&

ROBERT

B.

THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS

260 (3d ed. 1999) ("Normally, directors owe fiduciary duties to the
corporation, not to individual shareholders.").
ASSOCIATIONS
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that action. After all, the agent's ultimate duty of loyalty is to the
corporation itself.
With respect to disclosed price-decreasing insider trading, this
is the situation an agent confronts: the agent's sale on the basis of
negative inside information might injure an existing shareholder
(assuming, of course, that the purchaser is a current shareholder; if
not, there's no way the agent's action could involve any kind of
breach of duty).362
The corporation as a whole, though, would
actually benefit from the agent's action, for the disclosed pricedecreasing
insider trading would tend to reduce
equity
overvaluation3 6 and the costs associated therewith. 36' In short, the
agent faces a situation where an individual shareholder's interest in
candor conflicts with the broader interests of the corporation as a
whole. Since the agent's fiduciary duty is ultimately owed to the
corporation, not to individual shareholders,3 5 she would breach no
duty by furthering the corporation's welfare (and, admittedly, her
own financial interests) 366 at the expense of an individual
shareholder's financial interest. Thus, even if the gravamen of a
classical insider trading claim is breach of a non-waiveable fiduciary
duty, a corporate agent could engage in authorized price-decreasing
insider trading.
With respect to insider trading that increases stock price, the
situation is different. First, in every instance of price-increasing
insider trading, the insider will be dealing with a shareholder of the
firm itself; with price-decreasing insider trading, by contrast, the
insider will frequently be dealing with a party who, at the time the
trade is executed, stands at arms-length from the insider and is
owed no fiduciary duties.3 67 Moreover, while the specific facts and
circumstances of any instance of price-increasing insider trading
would determine whether corporate damage could result, it is easy
to envision situations in which such trading would harm the
362. See supra note 359.
363. See supra notes 260-80 and accompanying text (explaining why
disclosed price-decreasing insider trading would reduce overvaluation).
364. See supra notes 132-217 and accompanying text (discussing costs of
overvalued equity).
365. See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
366. The agent's receipt of trading profits would not, by itself, constitute a
breach of fiduciary duty. While agents generally have a duty not to accept
"secret profits" earned in connection with their work as agents, they breach no
duty (and thus need not disgorge such profits) if their principals have consented
in advance to their receipt of the profits. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§§ 387-88 (1958). Here, the express authorization to engage in authorized pricedecreasing insider trading would constitute consent by the principal that its
agents could keep any profits thereby generated.
367. See supra note 359.

HeinOnline -- 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1127 2006

1128

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

corporation itself, as well as the individual shareholder; as noted,
price-increasing insider trading, unlike the price-decreasing variety,
may thwart otherwise available corporate opportunities.3 68 Finally,
the "good news" upon which the insider engaging in price-increasing
insider trading bases his trade should likely belong to the
corporation, whereas the "bad news" underlying an instance of pricedecreasing trading should probably belong to the insider himself.36 9
There is, in other words, a more obvious property rights violation
(and, thus, breach of fiduciary duty) involved in price-increasing
insider trading. Accordingly, such trading probably cannot be
authorized if the gravamen of a classical insider trading claim is the
breach of a non-waiveable fiduciary duty.
CONCLUSION
Substantial equity overvaluation is bad for investors. Most
notably, it tends to create significant agency costs that result in the
destruction of corporate value. Recognizing this, legislators and
regulators have recently imposed a host of "top down" measures
aimed at preventing such overvaluation.3 7 ° Early evidence indicates
that this top down approach, hastily implemented as a result of
what Professor Larry E. Ribstein has dubbed "Sudden Acute
Regulatory Syndrome,"3 71 may create greater costs than benefits.372
This Article has therefore proposed a market-oriented, "bottom up"
approach to preventing or reducing equity overvaluation. The
proposed approach would generally permit disclosed insider trading
transactions that would tend to drive an overvalued stock's price
downward toward actual value, while generally banning insider
trading that would increase a stock's price. Given the benefits and
costs occasioned by the different species of insider trading, this
asymmetric insider trading regime is likely the policy most investors
and managers would agree to if they were practically and legally
able to do so. Securities regulators should therefore adopt it as the
368. See supra notes 218-27 and accompanying text (explaining why priceincreasing insider trading could destroy corporate value by thwarting corporate
opportunities, and why price-decreasing insider trading generally could not do
so).
369. See supra notes 237-47 and accompanying text (explaining why
property right to positive inside information should belong to corporation,
whereas right to negative inside information should belong to corporate agents).
370. Those top down measures include required internal monitoring, stricter
regulation of gatekeepers, more stringent rules on insider misconduct,
enhanced disclosure requirements, and beefed-up regulation of securities
analysts. See Sarbanes-OxleyAfter Three Years, supra note 5, at 6-7.
371. Id. at 7.
372. Id. at 7-14. See generally Romano, supranote 5.
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default policy for corporations.
In asking what shareholders and corporate managers would
bargain for were they practically and legally able to do so, this
Article builds on the work of scholars who have argued that insider
trading policy should be handled via contract-i.e., that corporate
constituents should be allowed to allocate the right to inside
information among themselves as they see fit.37 3 The Article makes
two contributions to the work of these contractarians. First, by
segregating the two types of insider trading (price-increasing and
price-decreasing) and assessing the investor benefits and harms
occasioned by each, the Article is able to predict the insider trading
bargain corporate constituents would likely strike. That is an
important contribution, for even if a purely contractarian approach
were adopted, the law must select a default rule that will apply
absent any express contractual provision, and that rule should
reflect majoritarian preferences. 4 Second, the Article proposes an
approach that could be implemented under current law. Most
insider trading scholars believe that current legal doctrine would
not sanction a pure contractarian approach under which
corporations may opt out of the disclose or abstain rule. By contrast,
the asymmetric approach advocated herein, which essentially
involves opting out of the disclose or abstain rule for publicly
announced price-decreasing insider trades, could be adopted under
current law. The approach therefore represents an immediately
achievable first step toward the deregulation of insider trading.

373. See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3.
374. This Article is thus wholly consistent with the approach of the
contractarians; it merely seeks to predict the dominant contract and proposes
that that hypothetical bargain become the default.
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